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Tracing CO2 Emissions in Global Value Chains 
 
1. Introduction 
The rise of global value chains (GVCs) during the last two decades has significantly changed the nature and 
structure of international trade, with many new implications for policy making. Studies on GVCs have 
focused on the creation and distribution of value added, employment, and income (OECD 2013; Timmer et al. 
2013; Ferrarini and Hummels 2014). In recent years, however, many scholars have turned their attention to the 
interaction of GVCs and environmental policies (Wiedmann 2009; Hoekstra and Wiedmann 2014). A large 
body of literature has developed to assess “consumption-based accounting” of historical emissions (Tukker 
and Dietzenbacher 2013). It adjusts the standard territory-based accounts of emissions by removing the 
emissions associated with exports and adding the emissions associated with imports (Peters and Hertwich 
2008). Most early studies focused on climate policy, where it was found that developed nations collectively 
have higher consumption-based emissions than territory-based emissions, meaning that they are net importers 
of emissions and thereby benefit from environmentally intensive production abroad (Davis and Caldeira 2010; 
Peters et al. 2011; Wiebe et al. 2012; Arto and Dietzenbacher 2014). The same conclusions have been reached 
for many environmental issues (Hoekstra and Wiedmann 2014), such as energy (Davis et al. 2011), air 
pollution (Lin et al. 2014; Kanemoto et al. 2014), material use (Bruckner et al. 2012; Wiedmann et al. 2013), 
land use (Meyfroidt et al. 2010; Weinzettel et al. 2013), biomass (Peters et al. 2012), water (Hoekstra and 
Mekonnen 2012), and biodiversity (Lenzen et al. 2012). This line of research has considerable methodological 
and conceptual overlap with the work on trade in value added (Koopman et al. 2014), but so far there has been 
very little attempt to formally link these two independent lines of research. That is the objective of this paper. 
In the 21st century, it is difficult to reasonably suppose that a country can be unconnected to GVCs. 
As a result, a share of a country’s value added or emissions generated from the production of exported 
products (intermediate or final goods and services) used to fulfill foreign final demand directly and indirectly 
has been increasing for both developed and developing economies. The converse to this is that a country’s 
final consumption causes emissions in other countries by its relation with imports of foreign goods and 
services. These effects are not marginal. International trade accounts for one-quarter of global emissions, but 
the contributions of exports to a country’s territorial emissions (median 29%, range 8–64%, year 2007) and 
imports to a country’s consumption-based emissions (median 49%, range 6–196%, year 2007) are significant 
(Andrew and Peters 2013). International trade plays a relatively larger role for small and trade-dependent 
countries (Peters and Hertwich 2008). These effects are growing over time, and the net transfer of emissions 
(production minus consumption) via international trade from developing countries to developed countries 
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increased from 0.4 Gt CO2 in 1990 to 1.6 Gt CO2 in 2008, which exceeds the Kyoto Protocol standards for 
emissions reductions (Peters et al. 2011). All these facts clearly imply that a country’s emissions level from 
the perspectives of both producers and consumers is crucially subject to its position and the extent of its 
participation, directly or indirectly, in GVCs through international trade.  
Better understanding of the relationship between emissions and GVCs requires a consistent and well-
defined accounting system, which can provide proper measurements to trace value added and the amount of 
emissions in each stage and from different perspectives along the GVCs. This paper aims to generalize all the 
existing measures related to embodied emissions in the literature, with the aim of providing a unified 
framework for tracing emissions in GVCs at the country, industry/product and bilateral levels.  
This framework allows analysts to address policy-related questions such as the following:  
1) What amount of emissions generated by a country’s specific industry is for its own use and how 
much is for consumption by other countries and sectors?  
2) How does a country’s production of a specific final product induce emissions from other sectors 
and countries along global production network?  
3) Who produces emissions for whom and by what route along GVCs in the production of gross 
exports?  
4) What amounts of emissions have been generated to create one unit of GDP in each stage of 
production through various GVC routes? 
In building a unified accounting framework, existing efforts toward the measurement of embodied 
emissions in trade, based on multi-regional input–output (IO) models, provide a good starting point (e.g., 
Ahmad and Wyckoff 2003; Lenzen et al. 2004; Peters 2008; Peters and Hertwich 2008a; Hertwich and Peters 
2009; Kanemoto et al. 2012). These efforts have significantly enhanced our understanding of embodied 
emissions in trade, but they do not completely address all the questions listed above. This is because most of 
these previous efforts focus on measuring embodied emissions at the country level, and are often not able to 
provide both industry/product-level and bilateral-level solutions for capturing the embodied emissions in trade 
through both upstream and downstream supply chains.  
In this paper, we first use a traditional two-country, two-sector multi-regional IO model to provide a 
simple but transparent explanation of the difference between the forward and backward industrial-linkage-
based decomposition techniques originally developed by Leontief (1936). Using the forward industrial-
linkage-based decomposition, the total emissions from a country/industry can be traced according to where the 
produced final goods and services are consumed and from which downstream GVC routes they came. This is 
consistent with the production-based National Emission Inventory (NEI), which is conducted according to the 
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economic activities of residential institutions as defined by the System of National Accounts (SNA). This 
provides information that is similar to GDP by-industry statistics (de Haan and Keuning 1996, 2001; Pedersen 
and de Haan 2006). Using the backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition, we show that the total 
emissions from all production stages of a final good or service in a global value chain can also be fully 
identified. 
To answer questions 1) and 2) listed above, applying Leontief’s original insight is sufficient. However, 
measuring global emissions generated by a country’s gross exports and tracing its source structure (questions 
3 and 4) requires extending Leontief’s original method to decompose gross intermediate trade flows across 
countries according to their final absorption. To do this, we follow the idea presented in the recent innovative 
work of Koopman et al. (2014), and Wang et al. (2013), in which they decompose all bilateral intermediate 
trade flows according to their final destination and express gross intermediate trade flows as destination 
countries’ final demands. This key technical step successfully converts gross outputs (and thereby gross 
bilateral intermediate exports)—usually endogenous variables in standard MRIO models—to exogenous 
variables in their gross-trade accounting framework. Applying this technique to measure global emissions in 
gross exports, we present a bridge to consistently link production-based and consumption-based accounts of 
emissions. In addition, using the same accounting framework to simultaneously measure value added and 
emissions in trade helps us to better understand in detail the potential environmental cost of generating GDP 
along GVCs at country, industry/product, and bilateral levels. 
The empirical part of the paper applies the integrated accounting frameworks described above to the 
World Input–Output Database (WIOD) for the years from 1995 to 2009 to develop a deeper understanding of 
the relationship between emissions and GVCs from various perspectives. Major findings of this research are 
summarized in the concluding section. 
 
2. Concepts and Methodology 
2.1 Embodied emissions through forward and backward industrial linkage  
The methods used to estimate embodied emissions1 are rooted in the work of Leontief (1936). Leontief 
demonstrated that the complex linkages among different industries across countries can be expressed as 
various inter-industry, cross-country transactions organized into chessboard-type matrices, known as IO tables. 
Each column in the table represents the required inputs from other industries (including imports and direct 
value added) to produce the given amount of the product represented by that column. After normalization, the 
                                                             
1A clarification is needed on what is meant by “embodied”. The emissions embodied in gross output/final goods or 
exports/imports can be defined as the emissions that occur in the production of a product. The emissions are not actually 
a physical part of the product, but rather, are emitted in the production of the product. 
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technical coefficient table represents the amount and type of intermediate inputs needed in the production of 
one unit of gross output. Using these coefficients, the gross output in all stages of production that is needed to 
produce one unit of final products can be estimated via the Leontief inverse. When the output flows (which 
are endogenous in a standard IO model) associated with a particular level of final demand (which are 
exogenous in a standard IO model) are known, the total emissions throughout the (global) economy can be 
estimated by multiplying these output flows with the emission-intensity coefficient (amount of emissions per 
unit of gross output) in each country/industry. 
To illustrate how the classic Leontief method works, let us assume a two-country (home and foreign) 
world, in which each country produces tradable products in N differentiated industries. Products in each sector 
can be consumed directly or used as intermediate inputs, and each country exports both intermediate and final 
products. All gross output produced by country s must be used as either an intermediate or a final product at 
home or abroad, that is 

Exports
srrsr
Domestic
ssssss YXAYXAX  r, s = 1,2,      (1) 
where Xs is the N×1 gross output vector of country s, Ysr is the N×1 final demand vector that gives demand in 
country r for final goods produced in s, and Asr is the N×N IO input coefficient matrix, giving intermediate use 
in r of goods produced in s. The superscripts in Asr and Ysr mean that s is the producing country and r is the 
destination country. In (1), AssXs+Yss is domestic use of products, while AsrXr+Ysr is exports to foreign 
countries, these in turn can be split into intermediate consumption AssXs+AsrXr and final consumption Yss+Ysr. 
The two-country production and trade system can be written as a multi-country IO (MRIO) model in block 
matrix notation 
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which shows a clear distinction between intermediate consumption (AX) and final consumption (Y). The 
intermediate consumption can be either used domestically (diagonals) or exported/imported (off-diagonals), 
and likewise for the final consumption. In this model, the final consumption is exogenous, while intermediate 
consumption is endogenous. After rearranging terms, we have 
,    (3) 
where Bsr denotes an N×N block matrix, commonly known as the Leontief inverse, which is the total 
requirement matrix that gives the amount of gross output in producing country s required for a one-unit 
increase in final demand in country r. The diagonal terms Bss differ from the “local” Leontief inverse 
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1)(  ssss AIL due to the inclusion of off-diagonal terms via the inverse operation. Ys is an N×1 vector that 
gives global use of final products from country s, including domestic final products sales Yss and final products 
exports Ysr.  
The intuition behind equation (3) is as follows. When $1 of final products (either domestic sales or 
exports) is produced, a first round of emissions is generated (denote as P). These are the direct emissions 
induced by the $1 of final products. To produce these products, intermediate inputs are required. The 
production of these intermediate inputs also generates emissions. This is the second round, or indirect, 
emissions induced by the $1 of final products. Such a process to generate indirect emissions continues via 
additional rounds of production throughout the economy, as intermediate inputs are used to produce other 
intermediate inputs. The total amount of emissions induced by the $1 of final products is equal to the sum of 
direct emissions and all rounds of indirect emission generated from the process of producing the $1 of final 
products. Expressing this process mathematically using the terms defined above, we have  
PBAIPAAAIPPAAAPAAPAPGHG  132 )(...)(....  (4)2. 
It can be shown that the power series of matrices is convergent and the inverse matrix exists as long as A has 
full rank (Miller and Jones 2009). 
For our later sector level analysis, it is worthwhile to break Equations (2) and (3) into sectoral details. 
For N=2, this can be re-written by element as follows: 
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2 Since y =1, it is omitted. 
3 The elements in the diagonal block of the A matrix are domestic input-output coefficients, while elements in the off-
diagonal block are import input –output coefficients. The Y matrix is similar. 
Domestic IO  
Coefficients 
Import IO  
Coefficient
s 
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where each element above is now a scalar: 
s
jx  is the gross output of sector j in country s; 
sr
iy represents final 
goods produced by sector i in country s for consumption in country r (i,j = 1,2); 
sra11  is the direct IO coefficient 
that shows the intermediate goods required in sector 1 of country s that are used in the production of one unit 
of gross output in sector 1 of country r, and 
ssb11  is the total requirement coefficient that gives the total amount 
of the gross output of sector 1 in country s needed to produce an extra unit of the sector 1 final product in 
country s (which is for consumption in both countries s and r). Other coefficients have similar economic 
interpretations.  
We condense the final demand vector in (3a) as 
   TrrssTrrrsrrrssrsssrss yyyyyyyyyyyy 212122112211   
and define the direct emission intensity as 
c
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c
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c
j xpf  for c = s,r, j=1,2. Then the estimation and 
decomposition of the country- and sector-level production of emissions can be expressed as 
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This matrix gives estimates of the sector and country sources of emissions in each country’s final goods 
production. Each element in the matrix represents emissions from a source industry of a source country 
directly or indirectly generated in the production of final products (consumed in both the domestic and foreign 
markets) in the source country. Looking at the matrix along the rows yields the distribution of emissions 
created from one country/sector across all countries/sectors. For example, the first element of the first row, 
)( 11111
srsssss yybf  , is the emissions created by sector 1 in country s to produce its final goods for both 
domestic sales and exports. The second element, )( 22121
srsssss yybf  , is the emissions generated by sector 1 in 
country s to produce intermediate input used by sector 2 in country s to produce its final products. The third 
and fourth elements, )( 11111
rrrssrs yybf   and )( 22121
rrrssrs yybf  , are, respectively, emissions from sector 1 in 
country s generated in the production of intermediate inputs used by the 1st and 2nd sectors in country r to 
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produce country r’s final products. Therefore, summing up the first row of the matrix, we obtain the total 
emissions generated from sector 1 in country s. This can be expressed mathematically as 
   rrsrsrrsrssrsssssssrssrsrssrsssssssssss
rsrrsrssssssssss
ybfybfybfybfybfybfybfybf
ybybybybfxfp
212111112121
r
11112121111121211111
2121112121111111 )( 


 (6) 
which distributes the total emissions produced in a country/industry according to where its final goods and 
services are consumed. The value of
s
jp  is consistent with the production-based National Emission Inventory 
(NEI) according to the economic activities of residential institutions as defined by the System of National 
Account (SNA), and is similar to GDP-by-industry statistics4 (de Haan and Keuning 1996, 2001; Pedersen and 
de Haan 2006).  
Looking at the YBF ˆ

matrix down a column yields emissions estimates from all countries/sectors across 
the world for the production of final products in a particular country/sector. For example, the second element 
in the first column, )( 11212
srsssrs yybf  , is the amount of emissions generated in sector 2 of country s to produce 
intermediate inputs used by sector 1 in country s to produce final products, and the third and fourth elements, 
)( 11121
srssrsr yybf   and )( 11212
srssrsr yybf  , respectively, are emissions generated in sectors 1 and 2 of (foreign) 
country r to produce intermediate inputs used by sector 1 in country s in the production of final products.  
Adding up all elements in the first column gives the global emissions generated by the production of final 
products in sector 1 of country s, that is,  
srsrrsrsssssss ybfbfbfbfyp 12121112121111 )()(  ,      (7) 
where )( 1
syp  denotes the total amount of emissions generated in the production of 
sy1 . It traces total 
emissions generated by the production of a final product in a particular country/industry according to where 
the needed intermediate inputs are produced along each stage (represented by different industries located in 
different countries) of the global production chain. This is the global “carbon footprint” of the consumption of 
sector 1’s products from country s. The last two terms represent imported emissions. 
In summary, the sum of the YBF ˆ

 matrix along a row represents the production-based emissions and 
shows how each country’s emissions in a particular sector are distributed to the consumption (across columns) 
of all downstream countries/sectors (including itself). It traces forward industrial linkages (downstream) from 
an emitter’s perspective. The sum of the YBF ˆ

 matrix along a column accounts for all upstream 
countries/sectors’ emissions to the production of a specific country/sector’s final products (carbon footprint); it 
                                                             
4For the difference between the production-based NEI estimates from the MRIO table and the UNFCCC NEI, see Peters 
(2008). 
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traces backward industrial linkages across upstream countries/industries (as different stages of production) 
from a global supply chain perspective.  
Therefore, the producer’s perspective (summing elements in a row) decomposes each country’s total 
emissions by industry according to where the consumption is made, while the supply chain perspective 
(summing elements in a column) decomposes the total global emissions from the production of a 
country/sector’s final goods and services according to where each of the needed intermediate inputs is 
produced. As an example, in the chemical sector, the producer’s perspective includes the emissions created by 
the production of chemicals that are embodied in the final goods exports of chemical products themselves 
(direct domestic emissions exports), as well as in the final exports of metal products, computers, consumer 
appliances, and machineries that use chemicals as inputs (indirect domestic emissions exports). Such a 
forward linkage perspective is consistent with the literature on the emissions content of trade. On the other 
hand, decomposition from a global supply chain perspective includes all upstream sectors/countries’ 
contributions to emissions in a specific sector/country’s final goods exports. For instance, in the automobile 
industry, it includes emissions generated in the automobile production itself as well as emissions embodied in 
inputs from all other upstream sectors/countries (such as rubber from country A, glass from country B, steel 
from country C, design and testing from the home country) used to produce an automobile for export by the 
home country. Such a backward industrial-linkage-based perspective aligns well with case studies of global 
supply chains of specific products in the literature.  
Each of these two different ways to decompose global total emissions has its own interpretations and 
thus different roles in environmental policy analysis. The decomposition of emissions by producing industry 
can address questions such as “who generates the emissions for whose consumption?” thus providing a 
starting point for the discussion of shared responsibility between producer and consumer at the industry level; 
while the decomposition of total emissions generated to produce a final product is able to answer questions 
such as “what is the global emissions level and what is the (country/emission source) source structure required 
to produce a car in Germany compared to that for China?” and can attribute the total emissions for a final 
product to each stage of production in the global supply chain, thus providing facts that improve 
understanding of the common but differentiated responsibilities among different production stages along each 
global supply chain.  
With a clear understanding of how total national emissions by industry and total global emissions by 
final goods and services production at the country-sector level can be correctly estimated and decomposed by 
the standard Leontief method (equation (5) or the YBF ˆ

matrix), we formally specify the decomposition 
methods used in this paper and their relations to other IO model based methods proposed in the literature.  
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2.2 Downstream decomposition: Decompose emissions from a country/industry based on 
forward industrial linkage  
Extending equation (2) to a G country setting, the gross output production and use balance, or the row balance 
condition of an MRIO table becomes  
*ssssss
G
rs
srsssss
G
rs
srss
G
rs
rsrssss EYXAEYXAYYXAXAX  

 (8) 
where 


G
rs
srs EE * is the total gross export of country s. Rearranging (8) gives 
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With a further decomposition of the gross exports into exports of intermediate/final products and their final 
destination of absorption, it can be shown that  
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Inserting (10) into (9) and pre-multiplying the direct emission intensity diagonal matrix F

, we obtain an 
equation that decomposes total emissions by industry into different components.  
)5()4()3()2()1(
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  
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G
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G
sr
ts
G
t
rtsrssssssss YBFYBFYBFYBALFYLFXFP ssssss  (11) 
Here, 
1)(  ssss AIL is the local Leontief inverse. 
There are five terms in equation (11), each of which represents emissions generated by the industry in its 
production to satisfy different segments of the global market. All the emissions that occur in region s are a 
result of various elements of production.  
 The first term: domestically produced and consumed final goods and services (Yss).  
 The second term: domestically produced intermediate goods exports ( ts
G
t
rtsr YBA  ) which are 
used by other countries to produce either intermediate or final goods and services shipped back 
to the source country as imports and consumed there. 6  
 The third term: domestically produced final goods and service exports that are consumed by all 
of its trading partners (Ysr).  
                                                             
5A detailed mathematical proof of equation (10) is provided in Appendix A.1. 
6This indicates the second term in (11) can be further split according to a country’s final goods and intermediate goods 
imports and each particular trading partner that the imports come from. 
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 The fourth term: domestically produced intermediate goods and services exported to country r 
for the production of final products consumed in country r (Yrr) 
 The fifth term: domestically produced intermediate goods exports to other countries producing 
their final goods and service exports to third countries Yrt).  
Note the summation in the last three terms indicates that these emissions generated by export 
production can be further split into each trading partner’s market. The sum of the last three terms gives the 
amount of emissions exports, and the sum of the last four terms at each bilateral route is the “Emissions 
Embodied in Bilateral Trade” (EEBT). Both of these amounts are frequently used in the literature on 
embodied emissions in trade, which we will discuss in detail later in this paper. The disaggregated accounting 
for total emissions by industry based on forward industrial linkage (downstream decomposition) made by 
equation (11) is also diagrammed in Figure 1. The number in the lowest level box corresponds to the terms in 
equation (11). 
 
Figure 1 GHG emissions production, by sources of final demand – Forward industrial-linkage-based 
decomposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Upstream decomposition: Decompose emissions from final goods by production stages in a 
global supply chain based on backward industrial linkage  
 
In the following we estimate the total emissions generated by a final product along the global supply chain 
identified by the last stage of production: a particular industry i located in a specific country s, which is 
denoted by 
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iy to be consistent in notation with the previous section. To produce
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iy , activities 
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= 1,…, N in each country s = 1,…,G are needed7. We first need to know the levels of all gross outputs 
s
jx
associated with the production of siy . This is estimated using the Leontief inverse as in equations (3) and (5).  
To be more specific to our current analysis, let us extend equations (3) and (5) to cover any number of 
countries (G) and sectors (N). Then we obtain the following equations. 
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With G countries and N sectors, A, B, 

F and Yˆ  are all GN×GN matrices. Bsr denotes the N×N block 
Leontief (global) inverse matrix, which is the total requirement matrix that describes the amount of gross 
output in producing country s required for a one-unit increase in the final demand in destination country r. 
s
cF  
is a 1 by N vector of direct emission intensities in country s, placed along the diagonal of the GN by GN 
matrix of 

F . The subscript c represents emission source. Five types of emission source are considered: (1) 
coal, (2) petroleum, (3) gas, (4) waste, and (5) others (non-energy). 
sX is an N×1 vector that gives the total 
gross output of country s; 
G
r
srs YY  is also an N×1 vector that gives the global use of final goods produced 
by s. Each column of the YB ˆ  matrix of Equation (13) is a GN by 1 vector, the number of non-zero elements in 
such a column vector represents the number of production stages in our accounting framework for the global 
                                                             
7 Production stages in the global supply chain are identified by each 
s
jx , the maximum number of production stages of a 
specific supply chain in this accounting framework is G*N, assuming industries with the same classification but located 
in different countries produce differentiated products and so are located in different production stages of the global 
supply chain. Such an assumption is similar to the Armington assumption that has been widely used in CGE models for 
decades.  
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supply chain of a particular final good or service
s
jy . 
Based on equation (13), we can decompose the total emissions of a final good or service by production 
stages and emission sources in a global supply chain based on backward industrial linkage as follows. 

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sr
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s
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s YPYP           (15) 
The first term in equation (14) consists of the diagonal elements in the last matrix of equation (13), 
representing emissions generated in domestic production process; while the second term in equation (14) is 
the sum of off-diagonal elements across the row and in a column in the last matrix of equation (13), measuring 
emissions generated in foreign production processes. The summation in the second term indicates that these 
emissions generated by foreign production can be further split according to the source countries. Note that
s
c
s
c FF


5
1
, that is, emission intensities by emission sources in each country/industry sum to the total emission 
intensity of that country/industry. Therefore, equation (15) measures the total global emissions for the 
production of final products in country s. The decomposition of total emissions by the production of a final 
good or service in a global supply chain based on backward industrial linkage made by equations (14) is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 GHG emissions in global supply chains – backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition 
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Based on equation (14), the consumption-based national emissions inventories for a particular product 
r
iy can be estimated for each country as a sum weighted by consumption source structure:  

G
s
s
icr
i
sr
ir
i
consumer
c yP
y
y
yP )()(  for c =1,2,3,4,5 ; i=1,2,…N    (16) 
Here, 
G
r
sr
i
s
i yy  is the total final production in country s of product i for all countries, and 
G
s
sr
i
r
i yy  is 
the total final consumption in country r of product i sourced from all countries. 
Using the estimates from equation (14) and weighting by each country’s source structure of the particular 
products it consumes, equation (16) allows one to estimate consumption-based emissions at country/product 
level and its results are different from emissions estimates obtained by using production emissions minus 
exported emissions plus imported emissions. Taking automobile consumption as an example, the production 
plus net transfer method used in the literature only can provide estimates on how much of the emissions 
produced in the global auto industry is consumed in a country, which does not equal global emissions induced 
by the total automobile consumption in that country. However, summing over all products or industries, the 
total consumption-based emissions for a country will be the same regardless of whether backward or forward 
linkage computation is used.  
 
2.4 Measures of embodied emissions in trade and their role in linking production-based and 
consumption-based emissions accounts 
In recent years, the international trade of embodied emissions has been a subject of substantial interest in both 
academic and policy circles. However, most MRIO-based measures of embodied emissions in trade in the 
literature have not made a clear distinction between emissions as calculated by forward versus backward 
industrial linkages and often focus on the global and country aggregate level. As we will show in this section, 
such a distinction is not important at an aggregated level, but is crucial at a disaggregated level. 
It is important to distinguish three measures of embodied emissions in trade and two measures of 
emissions embodied in a country’s gross exports at a disaggregated (bilateral /sector) level 
1. Embodied emissions exports, or emissions generated in production to satisfy foreign final 
demand, by forward industrial linkages (EEX_F);  
2. Emissions embodied in a country’s gross exports through forward industrial linkages (EEG_F);  
3. Embodied emissions exports, or emissions generated in production to satisfy foreign final 
demand, through backward industrial linkages (EEX_B); 
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4. Embodied emissions associated with bilateral gross trade flows that satisfy foreign final demand 
(EEX); 
5. Emissions embodied in a country’s gross exports through backward industrial linkages 
(EEG_B). 
At a bilateral sector or country sector level, emissions exports based on forward industrial linkages 
(EEX_F) for sector i and region r, are the emissions generated in sector i to produce, directly and indirectly, 
gross products exported from r to any other destination country except the country r itself (e.g., exports from 
the US chemical sector would include gross exports from US steel and machinery sectors in addition to the US 
chemical sector). There are two key issues to highlight here. First, using the example of emissions exports 
from the US chemical industry, is that some of the emissions produced by that sector can be exported 
indirectly via other US sectors such as steel, because US produced chemicals are used as intermediate inputs 
in the production of steel exports. Second, the portion of the emissions that is associated with products first 
exported but eventually re-imported to satisfy domestic final demand is not part of the embodied emissions 
exports. 
The term emissions embodied in a country’s gross exports, which we labeled EEG, refers to emissions 
from the production of the country’s gross exports. Because this measure focuses only on where the emissions 
come from but not where they are absorbed, it does not exclude the part of the emissions that is generated by 
producing intermediate inputs for other countries but eventually returns home via imports (i.e., is re-imported) 
to satisfy domestic final demand. It is conceptually similar to emissions embodied in bilateral trade (EEBT) 
defined by Peters (2008) and Peters et al. (2011). The EEG based on forward industry linkage, EEG_F, refers 
to the part of emissions generated from the production of the country’s gross exports from all sectors that 
reflect the domestic emissions originating from a particular sector, including the portion that eventually 
returns (which will be labeled REE_F) via imports. Because we already have a complete decomposition of 
emissions by industry in equation (11), it is convenient to mathematically specify EEX_F, emissions 
generated in production to satisfy foreign final demand, and REE_F, emissions generated in the production of 
intermediate exports for other countries which are then used to produce their exports and shipped back to 
country s as follows.  
tr
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Equation (17) is the sum of the third and fourth terms in equation (11) plus an additional term taken from 
the last term of equation (11) which only sums over third country t re-exports to a particular trading partner r 
(without the second summation over all r). Equation (18) is a further decomposition of the second term in 
equation (11). It measures domestic emissions embodied in intermediate exports from country s to country r 
that return to s and are ultimately absorbed in s via all possible routes through forward industrial linkage. Both 
portions are emissions related to international trade but for different market segments. 
We specify domestic emissions embodied in gross exports from country s to country r based on forward 
industrial linkages as 
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This measures what amount of domestic emissions can be generated from the production of gross exports 
srE  
in country s, regardless whether these gross exports are finally absorbed in importing country r or not. It can 
be decomposed into four parts:  
1. domestic emissions generated from the production of final goods exports,  
2. domestic emissions generated from the production of intermediate goods exports that are finally 
absorbed in the direct importing country r, and are either 
3. returned (re-imported) to the exporting country s, or 
4. re-exported to a third country t.  
It is identical to the “Emissions Embodied in Bilateral Trade” (EEBT) defined by others (Peters 2008; Peters 
and Hertwich 2008) in the literature on embodied emissions in trade. It is easy to see that REE_Fsr defined by 
equation (18) is exactly the third term in equation (19). We can show that, at the bilateral-sector level, 
)__( srsrsrss FREEFEEXELF s 

 due to indirect emissions exports through third countries. However, 
after aggregating over all trading partners, at the country-sector level,  
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The step by step derivation of equations (18) to (20) can be found in appendix A.2. The intuition behind the 
derivation is simple: both 
srFEEX _ and 
srFREE _ require that the emissions associated with a product is 
consumed in destination country r by definition, while 
srFEEG _  or EEBT do not have such restrictions and 
are concerned with only where these emissions are generated, regardless of where their associated products 
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are finally absorbed. 
Similar to Peters et al. (2011), we define the balance of embodied emissions in trade, or “net emissions 
transfer” as  

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sr
srs FEEXFEEXT __        (21) 
It is easy to show that 
sT equals the difference between production-based and consumption-based emission 
inventory. That is, 
)()( ri
consumerr
i
producererr yPyPT  .       (22) 
Embodied emissions exports calculated by backward industrial linkages at a bilateral sector or country-
sector level, which we labeled as EEX_B, refer to the amount of emissions generated by the production of a 
particular sector’s gross exports (e.g., US auto), which will include emissions produced by any domestic 
sectors (e.g., including US rubber, chemicals, steel, and glass) via backward industrial linkages, and is 
ultimately absorbed abroad or in a particular destination country. There are also two key features to take into 
account. First, the measure quantifies emissions to the sector whose products are exported. Second, the 
concept excludes the part of domestic emissions that is eventually re-imported. In general, at the country 
sector and bilateral sector level, EEX_F and EEX_B are not the same except by coincidence. However, once 
we aggregate across all sectors, the distinction between EEX_F and EEX_B disappears. 
To trace emissions generated by gross trade flows at bilateral and sector levels, it is useful to think of the 
total domestic emissions associated with gross trade flows that is absorbed abroad, denoted by EEX, as a 
distinct concept from EEX_B or EEX_F. It is also based on backward industrial linkages and is also ultimately 
absorbed abroad, similar to EEX_B, but does not require domestically produced emissions to be absorbed in a 
particular destination country. In other words, at the country sector level, this third trade-in-emissions measure 
is the same as EEX_B, but at the bilateral or bilateral sector level, they are different. As we will show later in 
this paper, EEX is the only emissions trade measure that is consistently associated with bilateral gross trade 
flows, while both EEX_F and EEX_B are not, due to indirect emissions trading through third countries. All 
these three measures exclude the part of domestic emission that first exported but eventually returns home. 
However, all of them are necessary to trace emission trade in gross exports beyond the country aggregate 
level. 
Measuring emission trade based on the backwards and forwards industrial linkages at a disaggregated 
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level is useful for different purposes. If one wishes to understand the global emissions level generated by a 
country’s gross exports and its source structure, the backward-linkage-based emissions measures are the right 
one to use. If one wishes to understand the responsibility for emissions from a given sector in the country’s 
gross exports from all sectors, one should use the forward-linkage-based measures. Earlier work has shown 
that these two approaches can be linked via structural path analysis (Peters and Hertwich 2006). 
As we have already shown, to decompose a country/industry’s total GHG emissions by source of final 
demand and measure domestically produced emissions embodied in a country’s gross exports from all sectors 
based on forward industrial linkage, applying Leontief’s original method is sufficient. However, for measuring 
global emissions generated by a country’s gross exports and tracing its source structure based on backward 
industrial linkage, Leontief’s original method will not be sufficient, as it does not provide a way to decompose 
gross intermediate trade flows across countries according to their final absorption, as illustrated in a recent 
NBER working paper by Wang et al.(2013). 
Following Wang et al. (2013)’s innovative intermediate trade flow decomposition method, we define our 
bilateral emissions trade measures based on backward industrial linkage by  
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where “#” is an element-wise matrix multiplication operator8. To facilitate the understanding of the three 
terms in the emissions trade measure defined in equation (23), we provide the following intuitive 
interpretations.  
The 1st term,
srTsss YBF #)( , represents domestic emissions generated by the production of final exports 
from country s to country r. The 2nd term, )(#)(
rrrrsrTsss YBALF , represents domestic emissions generated 
by the production of intermediate exports from country s used by direct importer (country r) to produce final 
goods and services and consumed in country r. The 3rd term, #)(
TsssLF {…} represents domestic emissions 
generated by the production of intermediate exports from country s used by the direct importer (country r) to 
produce intermediate or final goods and services that are re-exported to a third country t. The three elements in 
                                                             
8For example, when a matrix is multiplied by 1n column vector, each row of the matrix is multiplied by the 
corresponding row element of the vector. 
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the parenthesis, 
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show how the re-exports are produced in 
country r by using intermediate exports from country s as inputs. They represent final goods re-exports, 
intermediate goods re-exports for third countries’ domestically consumed final goods, and intermediate goods 
re-exports for third countries’ final goods exports, respectively. 
It is interesting to note that the difference between srEEX (23) and 
srBEEX _ (24) appears in only the 
third country term (the third term). The former includes emissions absorbed not only by country r, but also by 
third countries t and u (last three terms in equation 24). The latter includes not only emissions exports from 
country s embodied in its own gross exports to country r (the 1st and 2nd terms in equation 24, which are the 
same as the first two terms in equation 23), but also emissions exports by country s embodied in its gross 
exports to third country t, that are finally absorbed by country r (the last terms in equation 24). This illustrates 
why we claim that
srEEX is the only measure of emission trade which is consistently associated with bilateral 
gross trade flows. Neither emissions export measure captures indirect trade through third countries. 
Similar to the definition of EEG_F, we could also define EEG_B, the measure of domestic emissions 
generated from the production of bilateral gross exports at sector level based on backward industrial linkage, 
which refers to emissions from all domestic sectors induced by the production of a particular sector’s gross 
exports to a particular trading partner or the rest of the world, including the portion of emissions associated 
with exported products that are eventually re-imported, REE_B.  
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EEG_Bsr measures what amount of domestic emissions can be generated from all sectors in country s in the 
production of gross exports 
srE  in country s, regardless of whether these exports are finally absorbed in 
importing country r or not. The four terms in equation (25) have similar interpretations to those of the four 
terms in equation (20); the differences are that these terms include not only domestic emissions generated by 
the exporting sectors, but also those of other domestic sectors that contribute to the production of a particular 
sector’s gross exports.  
We define emissions associated with intermediate exports that are first exported but ultimately returned 
and absorbed at home based on backward industrial linkages from country s to country r as: 
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It is easy to see that REE_Bsr is exactly the third term in equation (25). We can show that EEG_Bsr equals the 
sum of equations (23) and (26) at the country aggregate level only.  
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Where u is a 1 by N unit vector. Detailed proofs of equations (25) to (27) are given in appendix A.3. 
To completely measure total emissions from the production of a country’s gross exports, emissions 
generated in other countries that provide intermediate inputs for the exporting country also have to be 
estimated. The foreign-produced emissions embodied in a country’s gross exports (FEE) can be defined as  
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Each term in equation (28) has an intuitive interpretation. The first term, 
srTrsr YBF #)( , is the importer’s 
(country r) emissions embodied in the final exports of country s to country r. The second term,
)(#)( rrrrsrTrsr YLABF , is the importer’s emissions embodied in the intermediate exports of country s to 
country r, which are then used by country r to produce its domestic final goods and services. The third term,
srT
G
rst
tst YBF #)(
,


, is foreign emissions from third countries t embodied in the final exports of country s to 
country r. The last term, )(#)(
,
rrrrsrT
G
rst
tst YLABF

, is foreign emissions from third country t embodied in the 
intermediate exports of country s to country r, which are then used by country r as inputs to produce its 
domestic final goods and services. 
Combining equations (23), (26) and (28), we decompose the total global emissions generated from the 
production of a country’s gross exports to its trading partner as  
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 (29) 
The first four terms of equation (29) represent emissions within the exporting country, which are a by-
product of generating the exporting country’s GDP; the last four terms in equation (29) represent emissions 
within foreign countries that provide intermediate inputs for the exporting country, but also create GDP for 
these foreign countries. The decomposition made in equation (29) is also shown in Figure 3.The number in the 
lowest level box corresponds to the terms in equation (29). 
 
Figure 3 Global GHG emissions in the production of gross exports – backward industrial-linkage-based 
decomposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It turns out that separating emissions by backward versus forward industrial linkages is crucial to 
properly tracing emissions in trade at a disaggregated level. To our knowledge, the literature on embodied 
emissions in trade has not previously made a clear distinction between them. While Peters et al (2011) made a 
distinction between emissions embedded in bilateral trade (EEBT) versus embodied emissions of final 
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consumption, they do so only at the country aggregate level. More importantly, they do not distinguish 
backward from forward industrial linkages—such a distinction is not important at the country aggregate level, 
but is crucial at a disaggregated level (e.g., Peters and Hertwich 2006). In particular, quantifying emissions via 
backward linkages is crucial to measure gross trade related emissions at the sector, bilateral, or bilateral sector 
levels. Therefore, a key contribution of this paper is to systematically develop these quantitative emissions 
trade measures at both aggregated and disaggregated levels. This will facilitate the empirical understanding of 
carbon leakage at the sector and supply chain levels and provide useful insights regarding the role of trade in 
decarbonizing the global supply chain and the design of an integrated climate-trade policy to support it. 
 
2.5 Relationships among different emissions trade measures 
The relationships among these different emissions trade measures can be summarized as follows. 
In a world of three or more countries, domestic emissions generated by the production of bilateral 
gross exports to satisfy foreign final demand (EEX), forward linkage-based emissions exports (EEX_F), and 
backward linkage-based emissions exports (EEX_B) are, in general, not equal to each other at the 
bilateral/sector level, though they are the same at the country aggregate level. EEX_F and EEX_B are also 
equal at the bilateral aggregate level, while EEX and EEX_B are the same at the country/sector level.  
EEG_F and (EEX_F + REE_F) are equal to each other at both country sector and country aggregate levels, 
but not equal at the bilateral sector level; while EEG_B and (EEX_B+ REE_B) are equal to each other at only 
the country aggregate level. Because both REE_F and REE_B are non-negative, EEG_F is always greater than 
or equal to EEX_F at country/sector level; both EEG_F and EEG_B are always greater than or equal to all the 
three measures of embodied emissions in trade (EEX, EEX_F and EEX_B) at the country aggregate level. 
While at the bilateral sector level, EEG (EEBT) measures can greater or smaller than EEX measures, as 
discussed in detail by Peters (2008). Finally, EEX_F and EEG_F as well as (EEX_F+REE_F) are always less 
than or equal to the sector-level total emissions production )( siyP . 
The intuition behind these statements is simple: since direct emissions exports at the sector level are the 
same for all three trade-in-emissions measures, only indirect emissions trades may differ. However, because 
such indirect emissions exports are part of the total emissions produced by each sector, the total emissions in a 
country/sector set an upper bound for forward linkage-based emissions exports and domestic emissions 
embedded in gross exports.  
The definition of these measures of embodied emissions in trade and their relationships are 
summarized in Tables 1a and 1b below. 
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Table 1a Definition of different measures of embodied emissions in trade  
 
Acronym 
or label 
Definition in words Key characters  Definitio
n 
equation 
# 
EEX_F Embodied emissions exports, 
forward-linkage-based 
1.Emissions generated in production goods and 
services that satisfy foreign final demand; 
2.Include indirect emissions exports ; 
3.Excluding emissions associate with intermediate 
exports that are returned and absorbed at home  
17 
EEX_B Embodied emissions exports, 
backward linkage -based 
24 
EEX Embodied emissions 
associated to gross bilateral 
trade flows 
23 
REE_F Embodied emissions return 
home, forward linkage–based 
Emissions generated by producing intermediate 
inputs exported to other countries, which 
eventually returns home via imports to satisfy 
domestic final demand 
18 
REE_B Embodied emissions return 
home, backward linkage–
based 
26 
EEG_F Emissions embodied in a 
country’s gross exports, 
forward linkage-based 
1.Production side concept, consistent to GDP by 
industry statistics  
2.Focuses only on where the emissions are 
produced  
3. Include the part of emissions that is generated 
by producing intermediate inputs for other 
countries but eventually re-imported  
19 
EEG_B Emissions embodied in a 
country’s gross exports, 
backward-linkage-based 
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Table 1b Relationships among different measures of embodied emissions in trade  
 Aggregation 
level 
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3. Empirical analysis 
 
Following the concepts and accounting framework proposed above, this section uses the WIOD 9  to 
demonstrate how this framework can help to gain a better understanding of the relationships between GVCs 
and CO2 emissions from different perspectives. While we focus on CO2 here, the framework works in the 
same way for any environmental stressor. 
 
3.1 Tracing CO2 emissions in GVCs at the national level 
 
Following Figures 1, 2, and 3, we first show how the accounting framework works at the national level. 
Figure 4 shows “who produced CO2 emissions for whom” by different GVC routes in 2009, using 
the two largest emitters, China and the US, as an example. This figure follows the forward industrial-linkage-
based downstream decomposition method (Figure 1). Clearly, most CO2 emissions (EH_F) are the result of 
satisfying the domestic final demand in each country without depending on international trade. This result 
holds for most large economies since the domestic portion normally accounts for the largest part of total final 
demand. However, compared to the US, this portion is much lower in China. More than 30% of China’s CO2 
emissions are induced by foreign final demand (EEX_F=EEX_F1+EEX_F2+EEX_F3). This is mainly for two 
reasons: 1) after China’s accession to the WTO, foreign final demand has played an increasing role in driving 
the growth of China’s GDP and the generation of China’s CO2 emissions (Peters et al. 2011); 2) the CO2 
emission intensity for producing one unit of GDP in China is higher than that in the US (Davis and Caldiera 
2010) (also see Appendix B4).  
Part of the CO2 emissions induced by domestic final demand may occur due to international trade 
through production sharing between home and foreign countries, as shown by REE_F. As an example, 
producing a car in China to satisfy China’s own final demand may require the importation of an engine from 
the US, which may use Chinese metal parts as inputs in its production. As a result, China’s final demand for 
its domestic final products may cause its own CO2 emissions to rise through the two-way international trade in 
intermediate goods and services. The forward industrial-linkage-based downstream decomposition method 
can also be used to trace foreign final demand in driving home-country produced CO2 emissions by different 
GVC routes. As is also shown in Figure 4, the share of CO2 emissions induced by foreign final demand 
through final goods trade (EEX_F1) for China is obviously larger than that for the US. This depends on both 
the CO2 emission intensity and how a country participates in GVCs. Most developing countries, such as 
China, join GVCs through exporting relatively large amounts of final goods in their early stage of 
                                                             
9 www.wiod.org 
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development. Appendix B1 provides more detailed forward industrial-linkage-based decomposition results at 
the national level for the years 1995 to 2009.  
 
Figure 4 Who produces emissions for whom (forward industrial-linkage-based decomposition, 2009) 
  
 
 Figure 5 uses Germany and China as an example to show how CO2 emissions are generated in GVCs 
by different emission sources when these two countries produce final goods and services. This figure follows 
the backward industrial-linkage-based upstream decomposition method (Figure 2). The foreign emissions 
induced by the production of final goods and services in Germany account for a relatively large share (more 
than 35% in 2009) compared to that in China (less than 10% in 2009). This depends on the countries’ CO2 
emission intensities, their cross country production sharing arrangements and the way they participate in 
GVCs. China’s CO2 emission intensity is normally higher than that of Germany (see Appendix B4); this 
makes China’s domestic emissions take a relatively large share in the production of final goods. On the other 
hand, Germany’s value chain has a relatively large foreign segment (relative to China, a country which is less 
integrated into the European Union), so more emissions may occur in other countries due to the induced 
demand for intermediate imports used for producing German-made final products.  
In addition to technological efficiency, the CO2 emission intensity may also depend on the structure of 
energy use. It’s easy to see that the usage of coal accounts for a very large portion in China’s domestic 
emissions when producing final goods and services, which is obviously different from that in Germany. In 
general, this indicator can help us clearly understand how a country’s production of final goods and services 
impact on the CO2 emissions in its upstream countries or industries (domestic or foreign) through various 
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GVC routes. Appendix B2 provides more detailed backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition results at 
the national level for the years between 1995 and 2009.  
 
Figure 5 Induced emissions in both domestic and international segments of GVC when a country 
produces final goods and services (backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition, 2009) 
  
 
Figure 6 Emissions embodied in gross exports (backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition, 2009) 
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 Figure 6 shows how Japan and China’s gross exports generate both domestic and foreign CO2 
emissions by different GVC routes in 2009 (cf. Davis and Caldiera 2010). This figure corresponds to the 
backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition on gross exports (Figure 3). Compared to Japan, domestic 
produced CO2 emissions in China’s gross exports account for a relatively large share (more than 90%). 
Though China imports more intermediate inputs than Japan does in producing gross exports, lower energy 
efficiency and high carbon intensity are considered the main drivers that increase China’s domestic emissions 
share in gross exports. When looking at the domestic CO2 emissions by GVC routes, a remarkable difference 
between Japan and China can be observed: Japan’s domestic CO2 emissions in gross exports are mainly 
generated in the production of intermediate goods and services that are exported to its trading partners, while, 
for China, final goods exports play a dominant role. This depends on both the way a country participates in 
GVCs and its CO2 emission intensity. China joins GVCs mainly by providing final products, as a result of its 
comparative advantage in assembly, while Japan participates in GVCs largely through high-tech intermediate 
exports as a result of its comparative advantage in capital and skill intensive activities. Though the major 
exports with high comparative advantage for China are textile and electrical products which may not emit a 
large amount of CO2 in their production processes, massive domestic intermediate inputs such as high-carbon 
electricity and chemicals are directly and indirectly embodied in these final product exports. As a result, 
domestic CO2 emissions through final goods trade in China accounts for a relatively large share of its total 
emissions induced by gross exports.  
The share of foreign CO2 emissions in gross exports also depends on both the way a country 
participates in GVCs and trading partners’ CO2 emission intensities. Japan’s import content in exports is lower 
than that of China, but its foreign emissions in gross exports are higher. This implies that relatively high 
foreign carbon intensity goods are embodied in Japan’s gross exports. In addition, one important advantage of 
using this framework is that we can easily understand who produces gross exports and CO2 emissions for 
whose consumption through which type of GVC route. For example, about 20% of CO2 emissions in Japan’s 
gross exports is for satisfying its direct trading partner’s final demand, but this is emitted in third countries 
through Japan’s use of intermediate goods and services to produce a third country’s exports (route 7 and 8). 
Given the extension of international fragmentation of production, this part of emissions in international trade 
tends to increase quickly if no global treaty is in place. We report more detailed backward industrial-linkage-
based decomposition results on CO2 emissions in gross exports at the national level for the years between 
1995 and 2009 in Appendix B3.  
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3.2 Tracing CO2 emissions in GVCs at the bilateral and sectoral levels 
 
As discussed in section 2, the accounting framework proposed in this paper can be used to trace CO2 
emissions in GVCs at detailed bilateral and sectoral levels. Figure 7 shows how emissions are generated in the 
CO2 intensive metal industry in three selected countries, China, Mexico, and Poland, to satisfy US final 
demand through different GVC routes. This figure corresponds to Figure 1 following the forward industrial-
linkage-based decomposition method. We use these three countries as an example here because they are all 
active players in metal products GVCs and are directly and indirectly important trade partners of the US, 
while being located in different regions: North America, Asia, and Europe. In addition, for most countries, the 
metal industry is always one of the largest emitters, with a relatively high carbon intensity.  
 
Figure 7 Metal industry's CO2 emissions exports from selected countries to the US by different GVC 
routes (forward industrial-linkage-based decomposition, 2009) 
 
  
Figure 7 shows the CO2 emissions in the metal industries in these three countries from activities to 
satisfy US’s final demand via different GVC routes. The pattern is mainly determined by a country’s position 
and participation in GVCs. China exports large quantities of final products to the US, so we see China’s metal 
industry’s CO2 emissions from satisfying US’s final demand arising mainly through final goods trade. Mexico 
is also close to the US consumer but unlike China, it is located in a relative upstream position since Mexico is 
one of the largest providers of parts and components of metal products to the US, for example, for the US auto 
industry. As a result, the CO2 emissions in Mexico’s metal industry are mainly embodied in its export of 
intermediate goods which are directly and indirectly consumed in the US. Poland is much further from the US 
consumer and is embedded in the EU economy, so it is located far upstream in the metal products GVCs. 
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Therefore, a large portion of Poland’s metal industry CO2 emissions are embodied in goods traded with third 
countries, such as metal products used in a German car finally consumed in the US. Tracing CO2 emissions at 
the bilateral and sector levels can definitely help us to understand how a country’s position and participation in 
a GVC impact on the sources of its CO2 emissions at industry level. 
Following the accounting method represented in Figure 2, we use German-made and Chinese-made 
cars as an example to demonstrate how these two large car producers cause upstream CO2 emissions in 
automobile GVCs. Figure 8 shows China, the rest of the world (RoW), and Russia are the countries most 
affected by car production in Germany, besides Germany itself. On the one hand, this is because these three 
countries are located upstream of Germany’s car value chain through providing intermediate goods and 
services directly and indirectly for German car production. On the other hand, it is a result of the relatively 
high carbon intensity for producing intermediate goods in these countries compared to other upstream 
countries, like the US and Japan. Another important factor is that different upstream countries involved in 
Germany’s car value chain rely on different energy sources to produce their intermediate exports. For instance, 
China mainly relies on coal-based energy, hence coal-based CO2 emissions account for the majority of 
emissions in China resulting from car production in Germany. Compared to the German-made car, the 
production activities of China’s car makers have a larger impact on CO2 emissions in the RoW and Russia. 
China overtook the US, becoming the world’s top auto maker and market, in 200910. Large amounts of 
components are imported from the RoW through various GVC routes directly and indirectly. As a result, the 
RoW has been the most affected upstream region in the production of Chinese-made cars. In addition, Japan 
and the US are also heavily affected since both countries are located in the upstream of China’s car value 
chain by providing high-tech intermediate goods and services. This is different from the cars made in 
Germany because Germany obtains almost all high-tech parts from its domestic suppliers rather than its main 
rivals, the US and Japan. 
Following the accounting framework proposed in Figure 3, Figure 9 demonstrates how a country’s 
gross exports generate both domestic and foreign CO2 emissions through different GVC routes at the bilateral 
level for a specific product. Germany, Mexico and China’s electrical product exports to the US are used as an 
example here. These three countries were the largest trade partners for electrical products with the US in 
Europe, North America and Asia, respectively, in 2009. Figure 9 shows that about 85% of CO2 emissions 
generated by China’s gross exports of electrical goods to the US are emitted inside China, a very large portion 
of which is from the production of final goods exported to the US. Compared to China, Germany and Mexico 
show a very different pattern. Their exports of electrical product to the US induce more foreign CO2 
                                                             
10 China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-01/12/content_9309129.htm, Updated: 2010-01-12 15:37 
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emissions. This difference is caused by several reasons that may operate in opposing directions: a higher 
domestic carbon intensity in producing goods and services leads to a larger portion of domestic emissions; a 
higher proportion of foreign intermediate imports in a country’s exports (implying a higher participation in 
GVCs), leads to a smaller portion of domestic emissions.  
 
Figure 8 Induced foreign CO2 emissions from producing cars in selected countries (backward 
industrial-linkage-based decomposition) 
 
  
Estimates based on WIOD shows that the import contents of electrical product exports to the US are 
24%, 53% and 32% for Germany, Mexico and China, respectively. Germany’s import contents are the lowest 
of these three exporting countries, but its gross exports to the US generate more foreign CO2 emissions. This 
clearly reflects two factors. First, Germany has relatively low carbon intensity in producing exports. Second, 
Germany may import more high-carbon intensity intermediate goods directly and indirectly from other 
countries for producing its gross exports to the US. Mexico’s imported content in its exports is the highest. 
This naturally leads to a large portion of foreign CO2 emissions in its gross exports. The US’s CO2 emissions 
generated by gross exports of electrical products from Mexico to the US account for a very large portion 
(routes 5 and 6) compared to that in other countries. This is mainly because Mexico needs more intermediate 
parts and components provided by the US directly and indirectly when producing electrical products for 
exporting back to the US. In addition, this accounting framework can not only identify who produces gross 
exports and CO2 emissions, but also help to identify who finally consumes the CO2 emissions embodied in the 
gross exports. Clearly, the embodied CO2 emissions in routes 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are finally consumed by the 
US; emissions in route 3 are finally consumed by third countries, emissions in route 4 are finally consumed by 
the exporting countries themselves. 
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Figure 9 CO2 emissions embodied in selected countries' gross exports of electrical product to the US 
(backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition, 2009) 
  
 
3.3 Bilateral Trade in CO2 Emissions 
 
As illustrated in Table 1b, at the bilateral-aggregate and country-aggregate level, there is no difference 
between the forward and backward industrial-linkage-based embodied emissions exports measures. Here, for 
simplicity, we define country A’s total CO2 emissions induced by its partner country B’s final demand as CO2 
emissions export from country A to B (emissions generated by production in A, but the produced goods and 
services are absorbed in B). Figure 10 shows the bilateral trade in CO2 emissions across the 15 largest 
countries or country groups for 1995 and 2009. In 1995, China, the US, EUW (the EU15), Russia and the 
RoW are the major exporters of CO2 emissions; Japan, the US, the EUW and the RoW are the major importers 
of CO2 emissions. The basic bilateral relationship remains unchanged between 1995 and 2009, but some 
interesting changes in the magnitude of CO2 emissions trade can be observed. For example, China’s exports of 
CO2 emissions increased dramatically and, at the same time, China also became one of the largest importers of 
CO2 emissions, especially from the RoW, the US and the EUW. This is mainly because China has been deeply 
integrated into GVCs not just as the largest final goods exporter, but also as an important intermediate goods 
importer which causes the CO2 emissions in the upstream countries which provide these intermediate products 
to China directly and indirectly. The most important concern is the increasing bilateral CO2 emissions trade 
between China and the RoW which are both developing economies with relatively lower environmental 
regulation (they both are Annex B countries in Kyoto Protocol). 
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3.4 The potential environmental cost of GVCs  
 
As discussed in section 2, the proposed accounting framework allows us to trace both value-added and 
embodied emissions concurrently in a consistent manner. By dividing the “trade in value-added” by “trade 
in CO2 emissions” (EEX_F
sr), the potential environmental cost can be obtained. The results for all WIOD 
countries for both 1995 and 2009 are shown in Figure 11. The environmental cost of value-added exports for 
Eastern Europe, China, India and the RoW is higher than that for other developed countries for both years. 
The cost decreases for almost all countries during this 15-year period. At the country to country level, more 
variation in the changing patterns can be observed. For example, one of the high-carbon interactions is 
Estonia’s export of value added to Romania in 1995. This situation changed dramatically, as the high-carbon 
trade moves to the flow from Estonia to Mexico, the Netherlands, and Turkey in 2009. In addition, the 
potential environmental cost of the bilateral emissions trade can also be identified by different emission 
sources, as shown in Figure B2 (Appendix B). To get one unit of value added from international trade, China, 
Indonesia, and some eastern Europe countries, like Bulgaria, Russia and Estonia, generate relatively more 
coal-based CO2 emissions. Malta, Greece, Cyprus and Taiwan emit more petroleum-based CO2 emissions. 
Russia, Romania, Canada and Mexico produce more natural gas-based CO2 emissions. These figures can 
provide a better understanding of how different countries produce value added and CO2 emissions as well as 
their ratios. 
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Figure 10 Bilateral trade in CO2 emissions  
 
1995 
 
2009 
  
Note: The magnitudes of emissions trade flows in this figure are based on EEX_Fsr. Exports from CHN 
(China) to the RoW (rest of the world) are respectively 104,563 kt and 584,219 kt for 1995 and 2009.  
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Figure 11 Potential environmental cost of trade (trade in CO2 emissions / trade in value added, 
kt/million US$, base year: 1995) 
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3.5 The relationship between GVC participation and embodied CO2 emissions in gross exports 
 
As mentioned in previous sections, a country’s gross exports can generate both domestic and foreign CO2 
emissions through various GVC routes. The magnitudes of these two types of emissions partly depend on a 
country’s position and participation in GVCs. Figure 12 shows the relationship between a country’s GVC 
participation (the level of foreign value-added in gross exports) and the share of domestic CO2 emissions 
embodied in gross exports for the top 20 exporting economies in the world in 2009. The size of a bubble 
represents the magnitude of foreign CO2 emissions embodied in a country’s gross exports. The rings with 
different colors surrounding the bubbles show two different GVC routes (through final goods trade or 
intermediate goods trade) and two kinds of products (energy goods and non-energy goods).  
The main features of Figure 12 can be summarized as follows.  
1. The higher the imported content in a country’s exports, the smaller the domestic CO2 emissions in its 
gross exports. When a country uses more foreign intermediate inputs to substitute for domestic inputs 
in producing exports, relatively less CO2 emissions will be generated domestically.  
2. The relatively higher carbon intensity for developing economies, like China, India and the RoW, leads 
to a larger share of domestic CO2 emissions embodied in their gross exports, although their shares of 
imported contents in exports are similar to some developed economies, such as Germany, France and 
Spain.  
3. The large scale of gross exports produced by China and the RoW and their relatively higher imported 
contents in exports compared to similar large countries, such as the US and Japan, cause more foreign 
CO2 emissions.  
4. Developing economies join GVCs mainly by providing relatively more final goods, which is clearly 
different from developed economies and is due to their different comparative advantages. For 
example, the foreign CO2 emissions embodied in gross exports from the US, Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
are mainly as a result of intermediate goods trade, while for China, India and the RoW they are mainly 
as a result of final goods trade.  
5. The RoW and China have been the top two regions inducing massive foreign CO2 emissions in 
producing exports. Besides their large scale of gross exports, both economies import high-carbon 
intensity components from each other.  
6. Japan, Korea and Taiwan’s bubbles are not only relatively large but also darker (higher carbon 
intensity). This is mainly because China has been their major trading partner, providing not just final 
goods but also intermediate goods. 
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3.6 Consumption-based versus production-based CO2 emissions and emissions transfer 
through different GVC routes 
 
As pointed by Peters et al. (2011), most developed countries (taken as Annex B countries in the Kyoto 
Protocol) have increased their consumption-based CO2 emissions faster than their territorial emissions. The 
net emissions transfer via international trade from developing to developed countries increased very rapidly 
and exceeds the Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction. We expand on Peters et al. (2011) (corresponding to 
Figure 1, the forward industrial-linkage-based decomposition method) to show the consumption-based and 
production-based emissions and their evolution from 1995 to 2009 for both Annex B and Non-Annex B 
country groups. In addition, we investigate how the international transfer of emissions occurs through various 
GVC routes with different carbon intensities.  
Figure 13 shows that production-based CO2 emissions for the Annex B country group have increased 
slightly in the period 1995-2009. Emissions exports for satisfying foreign final demands is the main driver of 
this increase, since territory emissions for fulfilling domestic final demands have shown a slight decrease in 
the same period. Consumption-based emissions for the Annex B country group experienced an increase due to 
increasing emissions imports (foreign emissions induced by Annex B countries). Looking at the increasing 
pattern for Annex B countries’ emissions in trade by different GVC routes, we find that trade in intermediate 
goods is the main contributor to growth for both exports and imports, with little change in trade through final 
goods except for a slight increasing trend for imports. Compared to the Annex B countries, the Non-Annex B 
country group shows large increases in both domestic emissions and emissions trade. The production-based 
emissions for the Non-Annex B group in 2003 exceeded the Annex B group’s peak level emissions (2007); 
Non-Annex B group’s territory emissions for its domestic final demands in 2009 were close to the level of 
production-based emissions for Annex B. The Non-Annex B country group also imports more emissions and 
has been at the same level as the Annex B group’s emissions exports. 
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Figure 12 The relationship between GVC participation degree and CO2 emissions (2009) 
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With the information about carbon intensity along different GVC routes, the major points observed from 
Figure 13 can be summarized as follows.  
1. Goods and services produced to satisfy domestic final demand generally have a lower emission 
intensity than that from satisfying foreign final demand for both Annex B and Non-Annex B 
countries. In other words, the international trade in carbon-intensive products tends to have increased 
in the last 15 years.  
2. An improvement of carbon intensity for both Annex B and Non-Annex B counties can be observed. 
However, the carbon intensity for Non-Annex B countries in 2009 is still higher than that for Annex B 
countries’ 1995 level. As a result, Annex B countries have more low-carbon exports, but more high-
carbon imports; Non-Annex B countries have more high-carbon exports, but more low-carbon 
imports.  
3. The rapid economic growth of Non-Annex B countries with relatively high carbon intensity during 
the period, especially China, boosts both domestic emissions and emissions trade. At the same time, 
the increasing GVC participation accompanying more trade in intermediate goods clearly spurs on 
emissions embodied in trade.  
4. The increasing complexity and sophistication in cross country production sharing also give an impetus 
to emissions transfer, since more cross-border CO2 emissions transfer arises through intermediate 
goods trade via third countries.  
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Figure 13 Consumption-based vs. production-based CO2 emissions and emissions transfer through different GVC routes (1995-2009) 
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3.7 The relationships among different measurements and their applications 
 
As discussed in section 2, all the measures of embodied emissions proposed in the paper are consistent with 
the SNA standard. However, different measures provide different tools to quantify embodied CO2 emissions 
trades from different perspectives. Table 2 extends Table 1b to real data to show the bilateral relationship 
between different measures of embodied emissions in trade for Electrical and Optical Equipment (WIOD 
sector 14) trade between China and Japan in 2009. To provide a better understanding of the differences 
between these measures, we apply both forward and backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition results 
to measure China’s Released Comparative Advantage (RCA11). 
The traditional RCA indicator (Balasa 1966) is based on gross exports. As shown by Koopman et al. (2014), 
this type of RCA may be misleading when gross exports embody large foreign value added. The better way is 
to use value-added exports to measure RCA which can avoid the so-called “double counting” problem in gross 
exports. We follow the same idea here to measure a country’s RCA by using both value-added exports and 
CO2 emissions exports. As mentioned earlier, according to the forward industrial-linkage-based 
decomposition, a country’s value-added or CO2 emissions exports at the sector level represent how much of 
this country’s specific sector’s value-added or CO2 emissions embodied in all downstream countries’ and 
sectors’ gross output is finally consumed in foreign countries. For simplicity, we call the RCA based on 
forward industrial linkage the “downstream-driven RCA” indicator. According to the backward industrial-
linkage-based decomposition, a country’s value-added or CO2 emissions exports at the sectoral level measures 
how much this country’s value-added or CO2 emissions in all upstream production stages are embodied in a 
specific product that is finally consumed in foreign countries. For simplicity, we call the RCA based on 
backward industrial linkage the “upstream-driven RCA” indicator.  
The upper part of Figure 14 shows China’s sectoral downstream-driven RCA ranking for both value-
added and CO2 emissions exports. For value-added exports, Electrical and Optical Equipment (WIOD sector 
14), Textiles and Textile Products (WIOD sector 4) and Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (WIOD 
sector 1) show the highest RCA since all these sectors generate more value-added for fulfilling a foreign 
countries’ final demand through global value chains directly and indirectly. However, for CO2 emissions 
exports, only Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (sector 17) shows an extremely high RCA. This implies that 
China’s energy sector emits large amounts of CO2 emissions for foreign final demands which are not seen in 
traditional trade statistics since there is a negligible amount of Chinese electricity exported.  
                                                             
11 The RCA indicator used in the paper follows the additional RCA measure proposed by Hoen and Oosterhaven (2006). This type of 
indicator ranks from -1 to +1, with a symmetric distribution that centers on a stable mean of zero, independent of the sector 
classifications used. 
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Table 2 The relationships among different measures of embodied CO2 emissions and their applications 
 
 
  
Level
 
Example
EEX EEX_F EEX_B REE_F REE_B EEG_F EEG_B EEX_F+REE_F EEX_B+REE_B
Bilateral-sector
(China→Japan,
WIOD14)
38,634 867 39,206 31 1,395 880 39,427 898                      40,601                  
Bilateral Aggregate (China→Japan) 147,839 147,022 147,022 4,645 4,645 152,256 152,256 151,667                151,667                 
Country-Sector
(China→World,
WIOD14)
557,698 12,463 557,698 428 19,804 12,891 574,614 12,891                 577,502                 
Country Aggregate （China→World） 1,971,179 1,971,179 1,971,179 50,471 50,471 2,021,650 2,021,650 2,021,650             2,021,650              
Indicators
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Figure 14 Downstream-driven vs. upstream-driven RCA for both value-added exports and CO2 emissions exports (2009) 
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The bottom part of Figure 14 shows the upstream-driven RCA estimates for China. Clearly, the RCA for 
value-added export is normally consistent to that for CO2 emissions export at the sector level. Comparing both 
measures for China’s Electricity, Gas and Water Supply sector, we see that from the perspective of a producer who 
makes Electrical products, the production process has a low-carbon intensity, but from the viewpoint of foreign 
user, this product has a high-carbon intensity since relatively large shares of CO2 emissions are generated in 
upstream sectors. Both downstream-driven and upstream-driven RCA indicators have their own roles in helping 
us better understand a country’s RCA from different perspectives. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The rise of global value chains has dramatically changed the nature and structure of international trade in recent 
decades. There is particularly strong growth in intermediate goods and services that may cross borders multiple 
times before the delivery of final products. It is difficult to understand “who produces value for whom” in a 
fragmented production system, compared to the relatively simple situation in the Ricardian era where exports 
were mainly final goods. The increasing complexity of GVCs has produced challenges for economic and 
environment policy as well as international governance. Therefore, it is important to understand to what extent 
GVCs impact on both value creation and emissions generation for trade and environment policies.  
This paper combines recent GVC-based measures with existing emissions trade related measures into one 
unified accounting framework, in which both value added and emissions can be systematically traced at country, 
bilateral, and sector levels through various GVC routes. It consistently defines various trade related embodied 
emissions measures at country, bilateral and sector levels and clearly quantifies their relations. Such a framework 
is not only able to identify value-added and emissions generated from each production stage (slice value chains), 
but can also identify the special trade routes by which value added and emissions are created. By combining 
value-added and emissions accounting in a consistent way, the potential environmental cost along GVCs can also 
be estimated (e.g., amount of emissions per unit of value added) from different perspectives (production, 
consumption and trade). This provides measures that clearly distinguish emissions of self-responsibility 
(emissions from satisfying domestic final demands without international trade) and shared responsibility 
(emissions through international trade) between producers and consumers located in different territories as well as 
their relative economic benefit to environmental cost ratio. 
To show how this proposed accounting framework works, selected empirical examples based on data from the 
WIOD were presented. These results show: 
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1) Since most countries have been deeply involved in GVCs in the past two decades, a growing share of their 
emissions are produced to satisfy foreign countries’ final demands. However, due to the difference in GVC 
participation patterns and carbon intensity, developing countries’ emissions exports take a relatively large 
share of their total production-based emissions and these are more likely to be created through trade in final 
goods than for developed countries.  
2) The differences in carbon intensity and position in GVCs between developed and developing economies also 
cause “carbon leakage” through international trade: developed economies tend to import more high-carbon-
intensity intermediate goods from developing economies in producing final goods and services. The 
environmental cost for generating one unit of GDP in domestic production is lower than that incurred through 
international trade. The main driver is the high-carbon-intensity trade in intermediates, which has grown 
rapidly during the period covered by WIOD. 
3)  “Carbon leakage” also happens inside non-Annex B countries, for example, between the largest two 
developing economies, which are China and countries in the RoW. The magnitude of their bilateral CO2 
emissions trade has exceeded all bilateral trade between any developed economy blocks and China (the EU-
China or the US-China). This could be a great concern since both China and countries in the RoW are Non-
Annex B economies and both have relatively weak environmental regulations. 
4) The environmental cost measured by “trade in CO2 emissions” divided by “trade in value added” shows a 
decreasing tendency for both Annex B and Non-Annex B countries from 1995 to 2009. Although the pace of 
decrease for Non-Annex B countries is faster than that for Annex B countries, the rapid economic growth of 
Non-Annex B countries has generated larger emissions in absolute terms: that is, the decrease of 
environmental cost in per unit GDP could not cancel out the impact coming from the increasing scale of 
economic activity in Non-Annex B countries. 
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Appendix A 12 
 
A.1 Step by step proof of Equation (10) in the main text 
Write
1)(  ssss AIL , then the last term of equation (9) in the main text can be written as 
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Rearranging gives 
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Inserting equation (A3) into (A1) gives 
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Using the properties of inverse matrices, we can obtain the identity 
                                                             
12
 We acknowledge Dr. KunFu Zhu’s help on related mathematical derivations. 
46 
 












































































GGGG
G
G
GGGG
G
G
GGGG
G
G
GGGG
G
G
AIAA
AAIA
AAAI
BBB
BBB
BBB
I
I
I
BBB
BBB
BBB
AIAA
AAIA
AAAI




















21
22221
11211
21
22221
11211
21
22221
11211
21
22221
11211
00
00
00
  (A5) 
From (A5) we obtain 
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From equations (A6) and (A7), we can obtain flow relationships between global block inverse matrices and 
local inverse matrices: 
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which is exactly the same as equation (10) in the main text. We can further show that 
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A.2 Step by step proofs of Equations (18), (19) and (20) in the main text 
 
As equation (1) in the main text shows, the gross exports of country s to country r can be decomposed into two 
parts: final goods exports and intermediate goods exports, 
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rsrsrsr XAYE           (A10)  
As illustrated in section 2.1 in the main text, final goods exports can be easily decomposed into domestic and 
foreign value added by directly applying Leontief’s insight. However, the decomposition of intermediate goods 
exports is more complex. It cannot be achieved by simply multiplying the Leontief inverse with gross 
intermediate exports because the latter has to be solved from the MRIO models first for any given level of final 
demand. Wang et al. (2013) provide a method to overcome this endogeneity issue by expressing all intermediate 
trade flows as different countries’ final demands according to where the goods or services are absorbed. Following 
their method, the gross output of country r can be decomposed into the following components according to where 
it is finally absorbed (obtained from equation (12) in the main text by pick-up country r only):  
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Inserting equation (A11) into the last term of equation (A10), the gross intermediate exports of country s to 
country r can be fully decomposed according to where they are absorbed: 
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(A12) 
This decomposition is intuitively illustrated by figure A1. 
After laying out the idea of how bilateral gross intermediate trade flows are decomposed, we provide a 
detailed step by step proof in a 3-country setting to simplify notation and make the materials accessible to more 
readers. Inserting equations (A10) and (A12 ) into the left hand of equation (19) in the main text, which defines 
domestic emissions embodied in gross exports from country s to country r based on forward industrial linkages, 
we obtain 
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Figure A1. Accounting for gross bilateral intermediate trade flows between country s and country r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: improved from Wang, Wei and Zhu (2014) Learning about global value chains by looking beyond official trade data: Part 1. 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/learning-about-global-value-chains-looking-beyond-official-trade-data-part-1 
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The 1st term,
srssYLF s

, represents emissions generated by each industry of country s embodied in its final goods 
exports to country r. The 2nd-4th terms (the 1st bracket) are emissions generated by each industry of country s 
embodied in its intermediate exports to country r that are driven by final demand in country r. The 5th-7th terms 
(the 2nd bracket) are emissions generated by each industry of country s embodied in its intermediate exports to 
country r that are driven by final demand in third countries (t). The 8th-10th terms (the 3rd bracket) are emissions 
generated by each industry of country s embodied in its intermediate exports to country r that ultimately return 
and are driven by final demand in country s. 
Based on equation (17) in the main text, EEX_Fsr, embodied emissions in exports from country s to country r 
based on forward industrial linkage in a three country world can be expressed as 
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Rearranging equation (A14) gives 
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Therefore,  
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(A16) 
The 1st bracket of equation (A16) is emissions by industry embodied in the intermediate exports of country s to 
country r that are ultimately returned to satisfy final demand at home, which is the same as equation (18) in the 
main text in a three country world. We call it REE_Fsr: 
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The 2nd bracket in equation (A16) represents emissions by industry embodied in the intermediate exports 
from country s to country r that are driven by final demand in the third country (t). The 3rd bracket in equation 
(A16) represents emissions by industry embodied in the intermediate exports of country s to the third country (t) 
that are driven by final demand in country r. It is easy to understand that the 2nd and the 3rd brackets in equation 
(A16) are not equal to each other except very special cases. Therefore, neither EEG_F nor VLE based on forward 
linkage equals EEX_F + REE_F at bilateral and bilateral sector level.  
However, summing up equation (A16) over all trade partners (i.e., countries r and t in the three country 
world), the terms in the 2nd bracket and the terms in the 3rd bracket will equal each other and cancel out: 
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Rearranging equation (A18) gives 
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(A19) 
Therefore, EEG_F or VLE based on forward linkage are equal to EEX_F + REE_F at the country/sector and 
country aggregate levels. This proves that equation (20) in the main text holds. 
 
A.3 Step by step proofs of Equations (25), (26) and (27) in the main text 
 
Inserting equations (A10) and (A12 ) into the left hand side of equation (25) in the main text, which defines 
domestic emissions embodied in gross exports from country s to country r based on backward industrial linkages, 
we obtain the following equations for the three country world.  
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This shows that EEG_Bsr can be decomposed into four parts: emissions embodied in final goods exports, 
emissions embodied in intermediate goods that are used to satisfy final demand in the direct importing country r, 
emissions embodied in intermediate exports returned to the exporting country s, and re-exported to third countries 
t. Emissions in these terms include emissions generated not only by the exporting sectors but also by other 
domestic sectors that contribute to the production of a particular sector’s gross exports. 
Based on equation (23) in the main text, EEX_Bsr can be expressed as 
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where  
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Inserting equation (A22) into equation (A21) we obtain 
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Therefore  
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(A24) 
The first term of equation (A24) represents the amount of emissions embodied in the sectoral exports from 
country s to country r that finally return home, and is exactly the same as equation (26) in the main text in a three 
country world: 
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(A25) 
The second term of equation (A24) represents emissions in the sectoral intermediate exports of country s to 
country r which are then re-exported to other countries (both countries r and s) to produce final products that are 
consumed in the third country t. The third term of equation (A24) represents emissions in the gross intermediate 
exports of country s to third country t to produce final product exports to country r or produce intermediate 
products exports to countries r or s for production of final goods and services consumed in country r. As we will 
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show later, 
srTrssrssssrrssrTsss YBALFYBALF #)(#)(   at the bilateral aggregate level but not at the 
bilateral/sector level. 
Therefore 
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It is obvious that the positive and negative terms in equation (A26) are not equal to each other except in very 
special cases. This indicates that EEG_Bsr and (EEX_Bsr +REE_ Bsr ) cannot be equal each to other at the 
bilateral/sector level in general. At the bilateral aggregate level, summing (A26) over sectors, we obtain  
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The two terms in equation (A27) are still not equal each other in general. Therefore, the sum of 
srBuEEX _  
and 
srBuREE _  does not equal 
srBuEEG _  at the bilateral aggregate level. 
Summing up equation (A27) over all trading partners r and t, the positive and negative terms will cancel out:  
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Therefore, equation (27) in the main text holds.  
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In a two-sector case, 
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However,  
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Both elements in the last term in (A29) are not equal to zero in general. However, after aggregating over 
sectors, the two elements will cancel each other, as shown in equation (A30) Therefore, summing up equation 
(A26) over all trading partners r and t, but not over sectors, the positive and negative terms will not cancel out, as 
in equation (A27). This means

G
sr
srBEEG _ is also not equal to the sum of 

G
sr
srBEEX _ and

G
sr
srBREE _ at 
the country-sector level.  
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Appendix B Additional results 
 
B1 Who emits CO2 emissions for whom 
 
Table B1 shows how much some selected large countries’ CO2 emissions are induced by different sources of final 
demand through different routes of supply chains for both 1995 and 2009. From the upper part of Table B1 we see 
that China’s total production-based CO2 emissions experienced the largest increase (128%) from 2,723,066 kt in 
1995 to 6,213,385 kt followed by India (108%) and the rest of the world (RoW, 37%)13. For all developed 
countries, their production-based CO2 emissions decreased, especially for Germany which had the largest 
decrease of 12%. 
Total production-based CO2 emissions can be decomposed into 5 parts (referring to Figure 1) according to 
sources of final demand satisfied. The structure and changing pattern among these five final demand sources 
between 1995 and 2009 are shown in the middle and bottom parts of Table B1. Obviously, for all selected 
countries and for both years, the CO2 emissions generated by the domestic production of goods and services that 
sell directly in the domestic market (EH_F) account for the majority of the total emissions, especially for 
countries with relatively large economic size. This is not surprising because most large countries’ production is 
mainly for domestic use. The interesting thing is that the share of the remaining 4 sources shows a very different 
pattern across countries. For example, in both 1995 and 2009, the share of China’s CO2 emissions generated by its 
production of final goods exports (EEX_F1) is the largest when compared to the other selected countries. This 
implies that China’s participation in GVCs is mainly through providing final goods exports and, naturally, 
relatively more CO2 emissions are generated by this route. In contrast, Russia’s CO2 emissions generated by 
foreign final demand are mainly from providing intermediate goods exports (EEX_F2 + EEX_F3). This 
phenomenon clearly illustrates that a country’s production-based CO2 emissions depend not only on the energy 
efficiency of its production technology, but also on its position and participation in GVCs. Both Germany and UK 
have a large portion of their production-based CO2 emissions that are generated by the production of exports to 
meet foreign final demand, as China does, but with a much higher portion of such emissions generated by the 
production of intermediate exports. When looking at the changing pattern of the shares between 1995 and 2009 
(the bottom right part of Table B1), for most countries except India, EH_F decreased, while other parts normally 
increased. This reflects the fact that most countries have been involved in GVCs and more of their emissions 
                                                             
13The RoW here is not the rest of the selected countries shown in Table 1; it’s the original country group of the RoW used in WIOD 
regarded as a group of all the other developing countries not covered by WIOD. 
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production is for satisfying final demands in foreign countries. In particular, the increase in the share for EEX_F2 
is about 61% (from 9.1% to 14.7%) for China, and 63% (from 13.0% to 21.3%) for Germany. Since both 
countries have been the main supply hub of intermediate manufacturing goods in international trade, a relatively 
large portion of CO2 emissions are naturally generated by this route. The share for EEX_F3 (emissions generated 
by the production of intermediates that re-exported to third countries) is lower than EEX_F1 and EEX_F2, while 
its rate of change for all countries is positive and very large. This clearly reflects the increasing complexity of 
GVCs, since more intermediate goods and services cross national borders more than once and are re-exported to 
third countries for further processing in the global production networks. In addition, the share for REE_F also 
experienced a dramatic increase for all selected developing countries, such as China (592%), India (294%) and the 
RoW (123%), although the absolute level of this share is extremely low. This implies that the final goods 
imported by China tend to embody more emissions generated by its own intermediate goods exports given its 
increasing presence in international production networks. 
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Table B1 CO2 emissions by sources of final demand (forward industrial-linkage-based decomposition, corresponding to Figure 1) 
 
 
 
 
  
CO2 Emissions
(KT)
EH_F REE_F EEX_F1 EEX_F2 EEX_F3 Sum EH_F REE_F EEX_F1 EEX_F2 EEX_F3 Sum
CHN 2,126,639      3,196      301,045    249,125    43,061    2,723,066      4,191,734      50,471    891,922    913,035    166,223    6,213,385      
IND 607,263        165        39,284      65,961      8,154      720,827        1,266,226      1,356      95,723      116,290    22,214      1,501,809      
JPN 874,562        3,068      43,965      90,214      12,458    1,024,267      753,151        3,223      47,700      124,446    25,217      953,737        
USA 3,869,470      38,148    142,285    262,327    29,954    4,342,184      3,719,713      29,436    136,290    264,124    38,152      4,187,715      
GBR 316,770        2,228      42,859      75,658      13,517    451,032        285,484        2,015      40,381      79,426      14,991      422,297        
DEU 542,851        7,014      61,628      94,494      18,717    724,704        383,503        7,692      81,929      135,490    27,695      636,309        
RUS 974,488        3,278      48,382      326,921    59,269    1,412,338      926,130        3,731      34,581      360,665    85,379      1,410,486      
RoW 2,626,249      30,223    218,217    442,696    59,812    3,377,197      3,341,296      92,569    292,962    784,936    129,232    4,640,995      
Share
(%)
EH_F REE_F EEX_F1 EEX_F2 EEX_F3 Sum EH_F REE_F EEX_F1 EEX_F2 EEX_F3 Sum
CHN 78.1% 0.1% 11.1% 9.1% 1.6% 100.0% 67.5% 0.8% 14.4% 14.7% 2.7% 100.0%
IND 84.2% 0.0% 5.4% 9.2% 1.1% 100.0% 84.3% 0.1% 6.4% 7.7% 1.5% 100.0%
JPN 85.4% 0.3% 4.3% 8.8% 1.2% 100.0% 79.0% 0.3% 5.0% 13.0% 2.6% 100.0%
USA 89.1% 0.9% 3.3% 6.0% 0.7% 100.0% 88.8% 0.7% 3.3% 6.3% 0.9% 100.0%
GBR 70.2% 0.5% 9.5% 16.8% 3.0% 100.0% 67.6% 0.5% 9.6% 18.8% 3.5% 100.0%
DEU 74.9% 1.0% 8.5% 13.0% 2.6% 100.0% 60.3% 1.2% 12.9% 21.3% 4.4% 100.0%
RUS 69.0% 0.2% 3.4% 23.1% 4.2% 100.0% 65.7% 0.3% 2.5% 25.6% 6.1% 100.0%
RoW 77.8% 0.9% 6.5% 13.1% 1.8% 100.0% 72.0% 2.0% 6.3% 16.9% 2.8% 100.0%
EH_F REE_F EEX_F1 EEX_F2 EEX_F3 Sum EH_F REE_F EEX_F1 EEX_F2 EEX_F3 Sum
CHN 97% 1479% 196% 266% 286% 128% -14% 592% 30% 61% 69%
IND 109% 722% 144% 76% 172% 108% 0% 294% 17% -15% 31%
JPN -14% 5% 8% 38% 102% -7% -8% 13% 17% 48% 117%
USA -4% -23% -4% 1% 27% -4% 0% -20% -1% 4% 32%
GBR -10% -10% -6% 5% 11% -6% -4% -3% 1% 12% 18%
DEU -29% 10% 33% 43% 48% -12% -20% 25% 51% 63% 69%
RUS -5% 14% -29% 10% 44% 0% -5% 14% -28% 10% 44%
RoW 27% 206% 34% 77% 116% 37% -7% 123% -2% 29% 57%
Change rate between
1995 and 2009
1995 2009
Change rate of CO2 emisions between 1995 and 2009 Change rate of shares between 1995 and 2009
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B2 CO2 emissions generated in domestic and foreign segments of global supply chains 
 
As shown in Figure 2, a country’s CO2 emissions can also be traced along global supply chains in terms of 
different types of energy source by using the backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition technique. Table 
B2 shows the decomposition results at the national level (sector aggregation) for selected countries for 1995 and 
2009. In absolute terms, in 1995, the US’s production of final products, no matter whether they are used 
domestically or internationally, generates massive amount of CO2 emissions (4,423,852 kt). The US is followed 
by the RoW (3,382,085 kt) and China (2,513,050 kt). This depends both on a country’s economic size and on its 
energy efficiency. In 2009, the situation changed dramatically: with a 125% increase compared to 1995, China 
becomes the largest emitter, followed by the RoW, the US and India. When looking at the share (the middle part 
of Table B3), we can see that CO2 emissions generated in domestic segments of global supply chains accounts for 
the majority of total induced CO2 emissions for all selected countries. This can be easily understood since, for 
most countries, their upstream supply chains are mainly located at home. However, the difference of the share 
across countries is still significant. For example, more than 20% of CO2 emissions from Japan’s, the UK and 
Germany’s production of final products are generated in foreign segments of global supply chains in 1995. This 
clearly reflects at least two facts: one is that these countries’ supply chains need more foreign intermediate inputs 
for producing final products, and the other is that much higher CO2 emission intensity is located in foreign 
segments of their global supply chains than for the other selected developing countries. 
The structure of energy use for producing final products in global supply chains varies across countries. 
China’s and India’s CO2 emissions generated in their domestic supply chains are mainly from the use of coal 
(76.0% and 64.1% respectively in 1995). This depends not only on their relatively rich endowment of coal, but 
also on the higher CO2 emission intensity in production processes using coal. This can also be indirectly 
confirmed by the fact that most of the CO2 emissions generated in the foreign segment of Japan’s supply chains 
were from coal in 2009, since most of its foreign upstream industries are located in China, which provides 
intermediate products mainly by using coal-based energy. 
When looking at the pattern of structure changes between 1995 and 2009 (the bottom part of Table B2), 
some important features emerge. 1) For all selected countries, the share of CO2 emissions generated in the 
domestic segment of their global supply chains declined, especially for China (-6.4%), England (-7.1%), Germany 
(-7.9%), and the RoW (-8.7%). On the other hand, the share of their foreign segments increased dramatically, 
especially for China (186%). Since countries tend to use more intermediate imports to make final goods, given the 
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reduction in international trade costs, naturally more CO2 emissions are generated in foreign segments of supply 
chains. 2) The share of coal, petroleum, and other energy-based CO2 emissions generated in the domestic segment 
decreased, while natural gas and waste-based CO2 emissions increased between 1995 and 2009. This reflects the 
fact that more countries are shifting to the usage of relatively low carbon intensity energy in the domestic part of 
their final goods production. Japan is the only exception, its coal-based CO2 emissions in domestic segment 
increased 32.0 % from 1995 to 2009. This is mainly because Japan’s energy efficiency is higher even if using coal 
to generate energy rather than thermal power generation; at the same time, it’s cheaper to import coal from 
neighboring countries, like China which is a coal-rich country. 3) For almost all emission sources, their shares of 
CO2 emissions in the foreign segment for all selected countries increased significantly between 1995 and 2009. In 
this regard, China’s change is the most remarkable. This is mainly because China has been both the largest final 
goods assembler and a producer which also needs to import more components and intermediate inputs produced 
by foreign countries. 
  
59 
 
Table B2 CO2 emissions to produce a final goods and services in global supply chains (backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition, 
corresponding to Figure 2) 
 
 
  
1995
CO2 emissions
(Kt)
Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal
CHN 1,911,062      293,157        38,157         -        187,373    2,429,749      23,052      31,061      18,937      386      9,865      83,301         2,513,050      
IND 439,230        139,432        24,262         -        43,743      646,667        11,451      12,235      9,829       174      5,027      38,716         685,383        
JPN 236,609        484,494        125,142        2,703      71,315      920,263        95,738      96,867      53,407      664      29,841    276,517        1,196,780      
USA 1,641,832      1,421,481      731,322        35,302    198,759    4,028,696      120,695    139,960    85,996      1,332    47,173    395,156        4,423,852      
GBR 139,308        116,119        71,457         1,191      32,567      360,642        37,565      41,270      24,354      786      10,758    114,733        475,375        
DEU 307,303        197,880        87,580         8,777      6,097       607,637        84,962      73,667      62,218      2,475    27,492    250,814        858,451        
RUS 260,885        215,568        451,172        9,283      87,242      1,024,150      7,602       7,172       4,209       178      3,297      22,458         1,046,608      
RoW 614,637        1,393,462      639,832        3,633      210,533    2,862,097      162,491    232,758    77,264      2,158    45,317    519,988        3,382,085      
Share (%) Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal Total
CHN 76.0% 11.7% 1.5% 0.0% 7.5% 96.7% 0.9% 1.2% 0.8% 0.0% 0.4% 3.3% 100.0%
IND 64.1% 20.3% 3.5% 0.0% 6.4% 94.4% 1.7% 1.8% 1.4% 0.0% 0.7% 5.6% 100.0%
JPN 19.8% 40.5% 10.5% 0.2% 6.0% 76.9% 8.0% 8.1% 4.5% 0.1% 2.5% 23.1% 100.0%
USA 37.1% 32.1% 16.5% 0.8% 4.5% 91.1% 2.7% 3.2% 1.9% 0.0% 1.1% 8.9% 100.0%
GBR 29.3% 24.4% 15.0% 0.3% 6.9% 75.9% 7.9% 8.7% 5.1% 0.2% 2.3% 24.1% 100.0%
DEU 35.8% 23.1% 10.2% 1.0% 0.7% 70.8% 9.9% 8.6% 7.2% 0.3% 3.2% 29.2% 100.0%
RUS 24.9% 20.6% 43.1% 0.9% 8.3% 97.9% 0.7% 0.7% 0.4% 0.0% 0.3% 2.1% 100.0%
RoW 18.2% 41.2% 18.9% 0.1% 6.2% 84.6% 4.8% 6.9% 2.3% 0.1% 1.3% 15.4% 100.0%
2009
CO2 emissions (Kt) Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal
CHN 4,098,564 552,773 142,473 0 326,088 5,119,898 161,716 170,108 146,806 3,421 54,990 537,041 5,656,939 125%
IND 952,788 244,857 79,460 0 85,728 1,362,833 57,762 36,723 32,685 510 13,875 141,555 1,504,388 119%
JPN 274,427 306,539 168,896 7,356 45,322 802,540 101,801 73,519 53,700 749 19,254 249,023 1,051,563 -12%
USA 1,632,018 1,259,978 798,603 53,355 126,083 3,870,037 238,903 160,596 136,688 2,075 55,471 593,733 4,463,770 1%
GBR 89,744 85,842 101,247 3,575 46,391 326,799 51,785 41,930 31,504 1,254 10,389 136,862 463,661 -2%
DEU 214,441 146,990 85,506 21,330 278 468,545 98,039 67,708 57,925 2,050 24,767 250,489 719,034 -16%
RUS 197,522 174,079 468,240 12,910 109,339 962,090 15,567 9,588 5,938 277 3,671 35,041 997,131 -5%
RoW 761,424 1,644,039 1,048,100 6,930 230,144 3,690,637 455,449 395,188 155,364 6,249 72,088 1,084,338 4,774,975 41%
Share (%) Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal Total
CHN 72.5% 9.8% 2.5% 0.0% 5.8% 90.5% 2.9% 3.0% 2.6% 0.1% 1.0% 9.5% 100.0%
IND 63.3% 16.3% 5.3% 0.0% 5.7% 90.6% 3.8% 2.4% 2.2% 0.0% 0.9% 9.4% 100.0%
JPN 26.1% 29.2% 16.1% 0.7% 4.3% 76.3% 9.7% 7.0% 5.1% 0.1% 1.8% 23.7% 100.0%
USA 36.6% 28.2% 17.9% 1.2% 2.8% 86.7% 5.4% 3.6% 3.1% 0.0% 1.2% 13.3% 100.0%
GBR 19.4% 18.5% 21.8% 0.8% 10.0% 70.5% 11.2% 9.0% 6.8% 0.3% 2.2% 29.5% 100.0%
DEU 29.8% 20.4% 11.9% 3.0% 0.0% 65.2% 13.6% 9.4% 8.1% 0.3% 3.4% 34.8% 100.0%
RUS 19.8% 17.5% 47.0% 1.3% 11.0% 96.5% 1.6% 1.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 100.0%
RoW 15.9% 34.4% 21.9% 0.1% 4.8% 77.3% 9.5% 8.3% 3.3% 0.1% 1.5% 22.7% 100.0%
Change rate of the share
between 1995 and 2009 (%) Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal Coal Petroleum Gas Waste Other Subtotal Total
CHN -4.7% -16.2% 65.9% -22.7% -6.4% 211.6% 143.3% 244.4% 293.7% 147.6% 186.4% 0.0%
IND -1.2% -20.0% 49.2% -10.7% -4.0% 129.8% 36.7% 51.5% 33.5% 25.7% 66.6% 0.0%
JPN 32.0% -28.0% 53.6% 209.7% -27.7% -0.7% 21.0% -13.6% 14.4% 28.4% -26.6% 2.5% 0.0%
USA -1.5% -12.2% 8.2% 49.8% -37.1% -4.8% 96.2% 13.7% 57.5% 54.4% 16.5% 48.9% 0.0%
GBR -34.0% -24.2% 45.3% 207.8% 46.0% -7.1% 41.3% 4.2% 32.6% 63.6% -1.0% 22.3% 0.0%
DEU -16.7% -11.3% 16.6% 190.1% -94.6% -7.9% 37.8% 9.7% 11.2% -1.1% 7.6% 19.2% 0.0%
RUS -20.5% -15.2% 8.9% 46.0% 31.5% -1.4% 114.9% 40.3% 48.1% 63.3% 16.9% 63.8% 0.0%
RoW -12.3% -16.4% 16.0% 35.1% -22.6% -8.7% 98.5% 20.3% 42.4% 105.1% 12.7% 47.7% 0.0%
Change rate
between
1995 and
2009
CO2 emissions generated by domestic segment of GVC CO2 emissions generated by foreign segment of GVC
Total
CO2 emissions generated by domestic segment of GVC CO2 emissions generated by foreign segment of GVC
Total
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B3 CO2 emissions induced by the production of gross exports for selected countries 
 
As shown in Figure 3, when applying the backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition technique, it will 
identify who emits CO2 emissions for whom to what extent in the production of gross exports. Table B3 
represents the decomposition results for selected countries at the national level for both 1995 and 2009. In 
absolute terms, the RoW’s gross exports induce the largest amount of CO2 emissions (869,561 kt) in 1995 
followed by China (717,838 kt) and the US (531,191 kt). The total CO2 emissions can be separated into domestic 
and foreign parts. The majority of induced CO2 emissions in producing exports were from the domestic side for 
all selected countries. However, if a country, in producing exports, has a relatively large part of the upstream 
production process outside its territory the share of foreign CO2 emissions could be large, as for Germany (33%), 
England (24%) and Japan (20%). Both the domestic part and the foreign part can be further divided into 4 parts, 
each based on different supply chain routes and types of final consumer. Obviously, in 1995, 97% of CO2 
emissions embodied in China’s gross exports is from the domestic side, in which 49% is for fulfilling final 
demand of trading partners who directly import goods from China; 35% is for fulfilling China’s trading partners’ 
demands for intermediate inputs in their production of domestically consumed goods and services; 13% is for 
fulfilling third countries’ final demands by providing intermediate goods to China’s trading partners for their 
production of exports to third countries; just 1% is for fulfilling China’s own final demand by re-importing what 
has been exported. For most countries, except China, their domestic CO2 emissions embodied in gross exports 
come mainly through trade in intermediate goods (parts 2, 3, 4). For Part 4, the figure for the US is larger than the 
other countries. This is mainly because the US re-imports a relatively large part of its own intermediate goods that 
have first been exported to global supply chains. For the foreign CO2 emissions in producing gross exports, 
Germany shows the largest figure, in which parts 7 and 8 account for 17% and 15%, respectively. This indicates 
that 17% of the total CO2 emissions embodied in Germany’s gross exports is from third countries which export 
intermediate goods to Germany for Germany’s further production of final goods for export to its trading partners. 
On the other hand, 15% of the total CO2 emissions embodied in Germany’s gross exports is from third countries 
that export intermediate goods to Germany, which uses these goods to produce further intermediate goods and 
exports to its trading partners for making domestically consumed final goods and services. Part 5 shows the CO2 
emissions induced in Germany’s trading partner countries that provide intermediate goods to Germany for its 
production of final goods which are finally consumed in its trading partner countries. Part 6 shows the CO2 
emissions induced in Germany’s trading partners which provide intermediate goods to Germany for further 
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processing into intermediate exports, which are imported by Germany’s trading partners for producing 
domestically used final goods and services. Together parts 5 and 6 account for just 1%, since this kind of feedback 
effect in international production networks is normally small. 
In order to investigate the structural changes of gross-export-based CO2 emissions between 1995 and 
2009 across different routes, we calculate the rate of change for both the absolute CO2 emissions figure and the 
corresponding share and show the results in the bottom two parts of Table B3. We see the following three features. 
1) The induced CO2 emissions in gross exports for all developing countries, such as China (262%), India (128%), 
and the RoW (85%), experienced a more rapid increase than developed countries. Given the decreasing CO2 
intensity, both for developing countries and developed countries from 1995 to 2009, the most important driving 
factor for this change should be the rapid increase of gross exports produced by developing countries. For 
England and the USA, there are only 1% and 5% increases, respectively. Japan and Germany also experienced 
37% and 48% increases, respectively. Although both of them have been service oriented economies, they still play 
an important role as two large trade hubs of intermediate goods in global supply chains. 2) When looking at the 
change of share, we see that the share of domestic CO2 emissions in producing exports decreased for all countries, 
while the share of foreign CO2 emissions increased for most countries, except England. This indirectly reflects the 
fact that most countries are getting to use more intermediate imports to produce their exports. As a result, 
relatively more CO2 emissions are induced internationally rather than domestically in producing exports. 3) 
Looking at the changing pattern for each part, we see that parts 3, 7 and 8 have a relatively large absolute share 
and also show a positive change of their shares between 1995 and 2009. Therefore, these parts can be considered 
the main leading factors that cause both the increase in the absolute emissions and the share of total gross-export-
based CO2 emissions for all countries. All these three parts are related to the third country effects in our 
decomposition. This implies that the increasing complexity of specific routes in global supply chains is often 
associated with a corresponding increase of CO2 emissions. 
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Table B3 CO2 emissions in the production of gross exports (backward industrial-linkage-based 
decomposition, corresponding to Figure 3)  
 
  
part 1 part 2 part 3 part 4 subtotal part 5 part 6 part 7 part 8 subtotal
CHN 301,045 214,501 77,685 3,196 596,427 1,241 940 12,392 6,839 21,411 617,838
IND 39,284 58,469 15,646 165 113,563 211 335 2,117 2,537 5,200 118,763
JPN 43,965 78,316 24,356 3,068 149,705 1,933 3,015 14,999 18,493 38,439 188,144
USA 142,285 228,543 63,738 38,148 472,714 3,176 4,034 25,195 26,072 58,477 531,191
GBR 42,859 61,174 28,001 2,228 134,262 1,784 1,973 20,562 17,855 42,174 176,436
DEU 61,628 76,173 37,038 7,014 181,853 2,924 2,586 45,228 40,108 90,846 272,700
RUS 48,382 260,126 126,064 3,278 437,850 85 286 993 3,679 5,043 442,893
RoW 218,217 382,331 120,177 30,223 750,948 5,530 5,760 50,908 56,416 118,613 869,561
part 1 part 2 part 3 part 4 subtotal part 5 part 6 part 7 part 8 subtotal
CHN 49% 35% 13% 1% 97% 0% 0% 2% 1% 3% 100%
IND 33% 49% 13% 0% 96% 0% 0% 2% 2% 4% 100%
JPN 23% 42% 13% 2% 80% 1% 2% 8% 10% 20% 100%
USA 27% 43% 12% 7% 89% 1% 1% 5% 5% 11% 100%
GBR 24% 35% 16% 1% 76% 1% 1% 12% 10% 24% 100%
DEU 23% 28% 14% 3% 67% 1% 1% 17% 15% 33% 100%
RUS 11% 59% 28% 1% 99% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 100%
RoW 25% 44% 14% 3% 86% 1% 1% 6% 6% 14% 100%
part 1 part 2 part 3 part 4 subtotal part 5 part 6 part 7 part 8 subtotal
CHN 891,922 764,257 315,000 50,471 2,021,650 16,375 15,473 109,535 75,942 217,325 2,238,975
IND 95,723 92,687 45,817 1,356 235,583 2,634 2,029 21,564 9,298 35,524 271,107
JPN 47,700 98,451 51,212 3,223 200,586 3,276 7,268 19,022 27,921 57,487 258,073
USA 136,290 220,410 81,866 29,436 468,002 5,376 7,886 36,705 39,913 89,880 557,881
GBR 40,381 62,046 32,372 2,015 136,814 1,592 2,249 19,409 18,977 42,227 179,040
DEU 81,929 105,433 57,752 7,692 252,806 5,599 6,615 75,059 63,183 150,456 403,262
RUS 34,581 254,843 191,202 3,731 484,356 143 591 919 4,147 5,800 490,157
RoW 292,962 658,916 255,252 92,569 1,299,699 8,670 18,993 120,711 157,417 305,791 1,605,490
part 1 part 2 part 3 part 4 subtotal part 5 part 6 part 7 part 8 subtotal
CHN 40% 34% 14% 2% 90% 1% 1% 5% 3% 10% 100%
IND 35% 34% 17% 1% 87% 1% 1% 8% 3% 13% 100%
JPN 18% 38% 20% 1% 78% 1% 3% 7% 11% 22% 100%
USA 24% 40% 15% 5% 84% 1% 1% 7% 7% 16% 100%
GBR 23% 35% 18% 1% 76% 1% 1% 11% 11% 24% 100%
DEU 20% 26% 14% 2% 63% 1% 2% 19% 16% 37% 100%
RUS 7% 52% 39% 1% 99% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 100%
RoW 18% 41% 16% 6% 81% 1% 1% 8% 10% 19% 100%
part 1 part 2 part 3 part 4 subtotal part 5 part 6 part 7 part 8 subtotal
CHN 196% 256% 305% 1479% 239% 1220% 1547% 784% 1010% 915% 262%
IND 144% 59% 193% 722% 107% 1151% 506% 919% 266% 583% 128%
JPN 8% 26% 110% 5% 34% 69% 141% 27% 51% 50% 37%
USA -4% -4% 28% -23% -1% 69% 95% 46% 53% 54% 5%
GBR -6% 1% 16% -10% 2% -11% 14% -6% 6% 0% 1%
DEU 33% 38% 56% 10% 39% 91% 156% 66% 58% 66% 48%
RUS -29% -2% 52% 14% 11% 69% 106% -7% 13% 15% 11%
RoW 34% 72% 112% 206% 73% 57% 230% 137% 179% 158% 85%
part 1 part 2 part 3 part 4 subtotal part 5 part 6 part 7 part 8 subtotal
CHN -18% -2% 12% 336% -6% 264% 354% 144% 206% 180%
IND 7% -31% 28% 260% -9% 448% 165% 346% 61% 199%
JPN -21% -8% 53% -23% -2% 24% 76% -8% 10% 9%
USA -9% -8% 22% -27% -6% 61% 86% 39% 46% 46%
GBR -7% 0% 14% -11% 0% -12% 12% -7% 5% -1%
DEU -10% -6% 5% -26% -6% 29% 73% 12% 7% 12%
RUS -35% -11% 37% 3% 0% 53% 87% -16% 2% 4%
RoW -27% -7% 15% 66% -6% -15% 79% 28% 51% 40%
Chage rate of
share (%)
Domestic CO2 emissions in producing exports Foreign CO2 emissions in supplying imported inputs
Total
Between 1995 and 2009
2009
Chage rate of
CO2 emisions (%)
Domestic CO2 emissions in producing exports Foreign CO2 emissions in supplying imported inputs
Total
Share
(%)
Total
CO2 emissions
(KT)
Share
(%)
Domestic CO2 emissions in producing exports Foreign CO2 emissions in supplying imported inputs
Total
Domestic CO2 emissions in producing exports Foreign CO2 emissions in supplying imported inputs
Domestic CO2 emissions in producing exports Foreign CO2 emissions in producing exports
Total
1995
CO2 emissions
(KT)
Domestic CO2 emissions in producing exports Foreign CO2 emissions in producing exports
Total
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B4 The potential environmental cost of value-added trade 
 
As mentioned in the second section, following the proposed decomposition frameworks, both value-added and 
embodied emissions can be traced at the same time. When dividing the induced value added by induced CO2 
emissions, the potential environmental cost can be easily obtained. As an example, we apply this idea to the 
forward industrial-linkage-based decomposition (Figure 1) to show the relationship between trade in value added 
and trade in CO2 emissions.  
 
Table B4 The potential environmental cost of trade in value added (using forward industrial-linkage-based 
decomposition) 
 
 
 
The main results are shown in Table B4. In general, the environmental cost for producing domestic value 
added without international trade (referring to EH_F) for all countries is lower than that of producing domestic 
value added through international trade. This implies that the value-added gain by international trade may be 
CO2 emissions/value-added
(KT/Million US$)
EH_F REE_F EEX_F1 EEX_F2 EEX_F3 Sum
CHN 3.6 4.6 3.9 4.6 4.3 3.7
IND 1.8 3.5 2.5 3.4 3.1 1.9
JPN 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2
USA 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
GBR 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4
DEU 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3
RUS 3.9 5.9 4.2 6.0 6.4 4.4
RoW 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.1
CO2 emissions/value-added
(KT/Million US$)
EH_F REE_F EEX_F1 EEX_F2 EEX_F3 Sum
CHN 2.1 2.8 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.2
IND 1.6 2.7 1.8 2.2 2.3 1.6
JPN 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2
USA 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
GBR 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
DEU 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
RUS 2.4 4.3 3.0 4.1 4.1 2.8
RoW 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.8
Change rate (%) EH_F REE_F EEX_F1 EEX_F2 EEX_F3 Sum
CHN -41% -40% -40% -42% -40% -40%
IND -13% -24% -28% -35% -23% -16%
JPN -13% -4% 0% 0% 2% -8%
USA -31% -27% -23% -29% -29% -31%
GBR -33% -36% -9% -33% -34% -31%
DEU -32% -24% -22% -24% -27% -26%
RUS -39% -27% -29% -31% -35% -36%
RoW -25% -34% -24% -29% -27% -24%
1995
2009
between 1995 and 2009
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through a high-carbon process, which indirectly reflects the fact of carbon leakage across countries due to trade. 
At the country level, Russia shows the highest environmental cost (4.4 kt/million US$) followed by China (3.7 
kt/million US$) in 1995, which are, respectively 18.5 and 22.0, times more costly than Japan (0.2 kt/million US$). 
In 2009, for all countries, a cost decrease can be observed, especially for China (-40%) and Russia (-36%). Energy 
efficiency changes and emissions-related regulation conducted both domestically and internationally can be 
considered as the main driving factors of this cost decline. However, the situation regarding carbon leakage shows 
no significant change, since the environmental cost for getting value added by international trade is still higher 
than that for pure domestic production in 2009. 
 
B5 CO2 emissions generated in the foreign segment of global supply chains by specific products 
 
The backward industrial-linkage-based decomposition technique can help us trace the CO2 emissions in supply 
chains at the detailed sector level for production of a specific final good in a particular country. As an example, 
Figure B1 shows the foreign sectors with the largest CO2 emissions (top 30 out of 1435 sectors across all WIOD 
countries) in China’s and Germany’s Transportation Equipment supply chains for both 1995 and 2009. The major 
features can be summarized as follows. 1) The most intensive emitters of upstream countries in both countries’ 
Transportation Equipment supply chains are from their neighboring countries. This is not surprising, since parts 
and components for producing cars follow the so-called just-in-time production system and trade costs across 
countries is one of the most important factors that affect the choice of production locations. It is, therefore, 
reasonable to build supply chains regionally rather than globally. 2) For both China and Germany, the most 
intensive foreign sector emitters in their Transportation Equipment supply chains are sectors 17 (Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply), 12 (Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal), 9 (Chemicals and Chemical Products), and 2 (Mining 
and Quarrying). This depends on how close and strong the upstream sector links with the final product of 
transportation equipment, as well as the intensity of the CO2 emissions arising from the production of parts and 
components directly and indirectly in the relevant upstream sectors. 3) Dramatic changes occur in the rankings of 
upstream countries and sectors during the 15 year sample period. This reflects the evolution of competitiveness 
not only in the quality and price of an upstream country or sector’s intermediate goods in supply chains, but also 
on their energy efficiency. 4) The foreign segments in German car production are greener than those of China  
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Figure B1 Foreign sectoral CO2 emissions (top 30 sectors) induced by a specific country's production of 
final goods (Transportation Equipment) in global supply chains 
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Figure B2 The potential environmental costs at the bilateral level for different energy sources (2009, 
kt/million US$) 
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Figure B3 The US’s trade balance of CO2 emissions with selected partners by different GVC routes (2009, 
kt) 
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Figure B4 Consumption-based CO2 emissions of a specific product (transportation equipment, WIOD 
sector 15 for 1995 and 2009) 
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Appendix C 
 
  
  
WIOD country/region names WIOD sector classification
Code Country Code Name EU 15
Annex B
used
Code Description
C1 AUS Australia ✓ S1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
C2 AUT Austria ✓ ✓ S2 Mining and Quarrying
C3 BEL Belgium ✓ ✓ S3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
C4 BGR Bulgaria ✓ S4 Textiles and Textile Products
C5 BRA Brazil S5 Leather, Leather and Footwear
C6 CAN Canada ✓ S6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
C7 CHN China S7 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing
C8 CYP Cyprus S8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
C9 CZE Czech Republic ✓ S9 Chemicals and Chemical Products
C10 DEU Germany ✓ ✓ S10 Rubber and Plastics
C11 DNK Denmark ✓ ✓ S11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral
C12 ESP Spain ✓ ✓ S12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
C13 EST Estonia ✓ S13 Machinery, Nec
C14 FIN Finland ✓ ✓ S14 Electrical and Optical Equipment
C15 FRA France ✓ ✓ S15 Transport Equipment
C16 GBR United Kingdom ✓ ✓ S16 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
C17 GRC Greece ✓ ✓ S17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
C18 HUN Hungary ✓ S18 Construction
C19 IDN Indonesia S19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel
C20 IND India S20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
C21 IRL Ireland ✓ ✓ S21 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods
C22 ITA Italy ✓ ✓ S22 Hotels and Restaurants
C23 JPN Japan ✓ S23 Inland Transport
C24 KOR South Korea S24 Water Transport
C25 LTU Lithuania ✓ S25 Air Transport
C26 LUX Luxembourg ✓ ✓ S26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies
C27 LVA Latvia ✓ S27 Post and Telecommunications
C28 MEX Mexico S28 Financial Intermediation
C29 MLT Malta S29 Real Estate Activities
C30 NLD Netherlands ✓ ✓ S30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities
C31 POL Poland ✓ S31 Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security
C32 PRT Portugal ✓ ✓ S32 Education
C33 ROM Romania ✓ S33 Health and Social Work
C34 RUS Russian Federation ✓ S34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services
C35 SVK Slovakia ✓ S35 Private Households with Employed Persons
C36 SVN Slovenia ✓
C37 SWE Sweden ✓ ✓
C38 TUR Turkey
C39 TWN Taiwan
C40 USA United States ✓
C41 RoW Rest of the World
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